Cooperation with middle-income countries : an incentive-based approach by Alonso, José Antonio, 1953- & Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo
José Antonio Alonso
COOPERATION 
WITH MIDDLE-
INCOME 
COUNTRIES: 
AN INCENTIVE-
BASED APPROACH
S
PA
N
IS
H
 
C
O
O
P
E
R
AT
IO
N
W
O
R
K
IN
G
 P
A
P
E
R
S
A
P
R
IL
 2
01
4
03
Notice: The analysis and conclusions or recommendations in this document 
are the exclusive responsibility of its author. They do not necessarily reflect the 
official opinion of the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation 
(AECID, in its Spanish initials), nor of any of its partners.
© AECID, 2014
Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID)
4, Av. Reyes Católicos, 
28040 Madrid, Spain
Phone: +34 91 583 81 00
www.aecid.es 
NIPO:
Editorial Coordination:  Christian Freres, Expert, Planning, Aid Effectiveness 
and Quality Unit, Office of the Director, AECID
Email: eficacia@aecid.es
Página Web: http://www.aecid.es/ES/la-aecid/eficacia-y-calidad
Design and formatting: 
Frank Martínez Soriano
Ana Carlota Cano
Ignacio Sagrario
Translation from original in Spanish:
Timothy Parket Watts (TLS Bureau Traducciones, SL), and revised by C. Freres
Cooperation with middle-income countries:
An incentive-based approach
_
José Antonio Alonso
Professor of Applied Economics,
Researcher, Instituto Complutense
de Estudios Internacionales, Madrid
Member of the Committee for
Development Policy, UN-ECOSOC
SPANISH 
COOPERATION WORKING PAPERS 2014
The 2013-2016 Master Plan for Spanish Cooperation 
reflects Spain’s commitment to the Middle-
Income Countries (MICs). This can be observed 
in the statement that Spanish Cooperation should 
“promote debate in the international community 
about the need to maintain support to the MICs, 
and particularly about the best ways to work with 
them”. This planning document draws attention 
to the increasing importance of this issue in the 
global development agenda, inter alia because of the 
increased number of countries that fall under this 
classification, on the basis of their per capita income.
In any case, this reiterates the clear strategic interest 
this matter has for Spanish development policy. 
However- and surprisingly- apart from the general 
references in master plans and in other documents, 
this priority lacks a firm doctrinal basis within the 
Spanish system. This means that, up to now, Spanish 
Cooperation has not defined specific strategic 
guidelines to justify this policy nor does it have 
general guidelines on how to put it into practice.
This is despite the fact that, since Spanish 
development cooperation began, it  has placed 
middle-income countries in a prominent position 
as partners. Initially, this bias was not the result of 
a decision based on an objective analysis of factors; 
instead, it  reflected the prevailing logic at the time: 
donors focused their help on countries that had been 
part of their former colonies and/or were located 
within their scope of geopolitical influence. 
Thus, it was not surprising for Spain to focus much 
of its cooperation on this group of countries. Along 
this line, the first executive body for this policy, the 
Institute of Hispanic Culture, targeted actions toward 
Latin American countries, most of which were MICs.
In the 1980s, when a new institutional framework 
was established for a more modern development 
cooperation, the privileged attention to these 
countries was evidenced through the opening of the 
first technical cooperation offices of what was then 
the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation –
set up in 1987, 25 years ago- in Central America. 
By the late 90s, and particularly since 2004, a 
process began which involved the extension of 
Spanish Cooperation’s geographical scope, especially 
with the aim of increasing the support given to low-
income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Even then, 
this cooperation still favored MICs among their main 
geographical priorities.
Indeed, the IV Master Plan points out Spain’s 
intention of focusing its aid on 23 countries at 
the end of its term, 16 of which belong to the MIC 
category. Likewise, Spain is one of the donor 
countries which have traditionally allocated most of 
its official development assistance (ODA) to these 
countries.
According to data from the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), in 2010-2011 the 
average Spanish net ODA that was channeled to 
middle-income-countries amounted to 55.7%. 
Although it fell significantly since the end of the 
previous decade, it was still well above the average 
for other DAC members (47.3%).
However, until the last decade not much attention 
was given to this distinctive aspect of Spain’s 
cooperation when it came to defining a national 
policy in this area. Previously, the bias toward 
MICs did not appear to require an explanation. 
Nevertheless, with advances in the international 
development agenda, especially since the Millennium 
Declaration, which prioritized aid for poorer 
countries, this preference was quite noticeable for the 
donor community, giving rise to some criticism.
So, at the beginning of the last decade, an 
attempt was made to justify the importance of 
maintaining support to middle-income countries. 
For this purpose, some studies were contracted and 
international seminars were held, but no significant 
impact was achieved.
By the mid 2000s, the political level of this effort was 
raised by partnering with the United Nations, which 
took great interest in the matter as it affects a large 
number of its member countries. This partnership 
was consolidated with the organization of the first 
Intergovernmental Conference on Cooperation with 
Middle-Income Countries in Madrid, on March 1 and 
2, 2006. Additionally, Spanish Cooperation financed 
a book and several documents on this subject.
However, shortly after it gradually lost the political 
impetus that had been achieved in the Madrid 
conference, and cooperation with middle-income 
countries fell into the background over the years that 
followed.
PROLOGUE 
The topic was addressed again at a general level 
during the preparation of the IV Master Plan, due to 
the fact that the number of middle-income countries 
had increased considerably in recent years, and it 
was subsequently acknowledged that no development 
agenda makes sense if it does not consider this group 
of countries.
In this context, the Spanish Agency for International 
Development Cooperation/AECID (the main 
executing agency of Spanish Cooperation) decided 
to start a reflection of its own, especially aimed at 
facing the practical implications based on a review of 
its work with middle-income countries. A first step 
in this process was the commissioning of a study 
directed by Professor José Antonio Alonso, Professor 
of Applied Economics in the Complutense University 
of Madrid, and Researcher of the Complutense 
Institute of of International Studies (ICEI).
The aim of this study was to provide a key reference 
on this subject, although it is not a Spanish 
Cooperation policy document. It was to be based on 
the consultation of actors within the Spanish system, 
particularly the Agency, while maintaining the rigor 
and objectivity of academic analysis.
In fact, this paper does not focus on the Spanish 
case, because it was also considered useful for 
disseminating these ideas to the entire international 
community. It is important to avoid confining 
the debate on cooperation with MICs within our 
own system or our dialogue with these countries. 
Undoubtedly, it is an issue on which Spanish 
Cooperation can assume certain leadership beyond 
our borders, and so it may be used as a tool for 
advocacy within international fora.
For Spanish Cooperation, it is hoped that this 
document will be useful in stimulating reflections 
and analyses aimed at further improving practices. 
Finally, it should be noted that this is a very 
appropriate topic to launch this series of Spanish 
Cooperation Working Papers: an instrument 
for the dissemination of analysis carried out 
by the organization’s staff members, or studies 
commissioned to third parties. This initiative has 
modest pretensions, and in the same way as other 
cooperation agencies do, we hope to contribute 
relevant ideas for the development cooperation 
agenda, and to serve as a vehicle to systematize and 
broadly disseminate the knowledge produced by 
various actors within the Spanish aid system.
Unit for Planning, Aid Effectiveness and 
Quality Unit, AECID
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.-IntroductIon
Acting upon the Paris Agenda recommendations, 
many donors reduced the number of countries 
in which they operate, partnering with countries 
with lower per capita incomes, or fragile States. 
Additionally, some donors proceeded to close their 
delegations in middle-income countries (MICs), or 
began to exclude such countries from their aid by 
applying graduation criteria based on per capita 
GDP. Consequently, the share of MICs in overall 
official development assistance (ODA) fell by one 
third in comparison with the 1990s. 
Without questioning the preference for poorer 
countries, there are, nonetheless, good reasons 
to maintain an active policy of cooperation with 
middle-income countries. The majority of the total 
population and of poor people in the developing 
world reside in middle-income countries: ending 
poverty will be difficult unless we also work with the 
countries where most poor people live. Some MICs 
also suffer from considerable structural deficits and 
severe vulnerabilities which are a common source of 
bottlenecks and even reversals of their development 
process (the so-called “middle-income traps”): 
development cooperation can be an instrument to 
help those countries overcome said bottlenecks. 
Finally, middle-income countries are called to take 
on greater responsibility in the solving of regional 
and global problems: development cooperation 
may also play a role in supporting their growing 
involvement in global-scale cooperative actions. The 
above-stated reasons become even more relevant if 
we consider the major changes which are taking place 
in the international system, many of which are led by 
middle-income countries.
Greater donor involvement in these countries would 
have a two-fold consequence. Firstly, it would allow 
for cooperation to adapt more fully to the new global 
system, and respond to the fact that the majority of 
the developing world’s population (and poor people) 
reside in MICs. Secondly, it would lead to launching 
a more horizontal type of cooperation, based 
on incentives, integrated by multiple actors and 
using various instruments going beyond ODA, and 
which, up to a certain point, anticipates what future 
development cooperation should be like, something 
which can be seen in the recent agreements of the IV 
High Level Forum of Aid Effectiveness of Busan.
In sum, the cooperation system should be 
willing to assume a more comprehensive and 
complex perspective, modulating its support and 
differentiating its agendas, resorting to combinations 
of different instruments from broader areas other 
than those of ODA, to suit the conditions and needs 
of recipient countries. The developing world is now 
more heterogeneous than before, and development 
cooperation system should be prepared to face such 
diversity.
2.- changes In the
InternatIonal context
Several changes in the international context have 
contributed to enhancing the role that middle-
income countries are called to play in the global 
system in general –and in the cooperation system in 
particular– over the near future. Four key trends are 
underlined here:
First, the increasing heterogeneity of the developing 
world. International aid was born under the 
assumption that developing countries formed a 
homogeneous reality that was markedly different to 
that of developed countries (the North-South gap). 
Nowadays, reality is quite different: heterogeneity 
in the developing world is significantly higher, while 
countries are now situated along a broader (and 
continuous) spectrum of development levels. 
One consequence of this process is the change in 
classification of countries based on their per capita 
income. The low income category is considerably 
reduced: in 2010 it included only 35 countries, 
representing 11% of the world’s population, while 
the heterogeneous middle-income group comprised 
110 countries, or 72% of the world’s population. This 
means that most countries and the majority of the 
population of the developing world is now located in 
the middle-income category.
Responding to such heterogeneity is a challenge for 
the development cooperation system, faced with 
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two alternative options: one is to convert  aid into 
a policy that is increasingly focused on fighting 
extreme poverty, with an agenda exclusively targeted 
on poorer countries; the other is to take a  more  
integral perspective for all developing countries, 
working with differentiated agendas based on each 
country’s specific conditions , including MICs with 
severe vulnerabilities. Of the two options, the latter is 
defended in this document.
Second, geographical patterns of poverty have 
changed. A first aspect to highlight is that there has 
been a significant reduction in the number of people 
living with less than 1.25 dollars a day (and the same 
applies to the 2-dollar threshold). Secondly, there has 
been a change in the location of poor populations: 
middle-income countries currently concentrate more 
than two thirds of the absolute poor population on 
a world scale. This geographical pattern is entirely 
new, since in 1990 over 90% of the absolute poor 
used to live in low-income countries.
Although middle-income countries have more 
chances to eradicate poverty than low-income ones, 
it is clear that not all of them can do so on their 
own and with the required speed and success levels. 
Development cooperation can contribute to this 
task, by boosting and supporting distributive and 
growth policies aimed at reducing poverty in partner 
countries.  
Third, the emergence of an increasingly multi-polar 
world. Development assistance was launched within 
a world that was characterized by the presence of 
two opposing blocks; today, however, that world no 
longer exists, since a more complex and multi-polar 
world is taking shape. New developing world powers 
have emerged, characterized by highly dynamic 
economies and a growing capacity for international 
projection.  
This multi-polarity requires a new view of the 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” 
principle: this can no longer be interpreted as 
a dualistic segregation between developed and 
developing countries, but rather as a continuum 
of levels of commitment based on each country’s 
degree of development. This interpretation has major 
implications for the aid system, since many new 
powers, together with other MICs, have assumed 
those responsibilities by launching aid programs 
aimed at other developing countries, through various 
South-South cooperation actions, which donors 
should support. 
Finally, the expansion of the space for international 
public goods, some of them being closely linked to 
the development agenda. In the current world, it is 
hard to reach any achievements in the fight against 
poverty unless action is taken within the sphere of 
international public goods (peace and safety, global 
health, climate change, financial stability, etc.); at 
the same time, progress toward the provision of 
these goods is hard to attain unless international 
inequalities are corrected simultaneously.
The appropriate integration of both agendas poses 
a major challenge for the international cooperation 
system, which must define the financial instruments 
and mechanisms for each case; and it must establish, 
when required, certain tradeoffs between respective 
priorities (for instance, between economic growth 
and environmental sustainability). In that regard, 
middle-income countries play a crucial role in the 
agenda of international public goods, not only 
because they are key for the provision of a large 
part of such goods, but also because as economies 
with increasing international presence, they are 
among those who are primarily concerned with the 
appropriate and fair definition of this agenda.
3.-Why cooperate WIth
MIddle-IncoMe countrIes
The need to address the changes described before 
poses significant challenges to the development 
cooperation system. Restricting aid to fighting 
extreme poverty alone, focused on a small group 
of poor countries and ruled by traditional donors 
does not seem to be a good way of responding to 
the coming world. Instead, development policy 
should be conceived through a more comprehensive 
perspective, which comprises a large part of the 
heterogeneous developing world, with an agenda 
that is differentiated according to each country’s 
conditions, which allows for shared but differentiated 
responsibilities by Southern donors, and attempts 
to connect the development agenda with the 
international public goods agenda. To sum up, aid 
should be conceived as an integral, complex and 
differentiated policy based on the conditions of each 
country, including those MICs which require it.
Nonetheless, in the case of middle-income countries, 
aid will always be a smaller part of their internacional 
funding. In this regard, if aid has an impact in those 
countries it will not be for what is directly financed 
by it, but rather because of the type of incentives 
it promotes in such countries. For this reason, aid 
must be especially considered for its capacity to: 
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i) mobilize additional resources and capacities; 
ii) alleviate restrictions and bottlenecks in change 
processes; iii) reduce uncertainties and risks; and, 
iv) promote change processes. This means that an 
incentive-based approach should be adopted. 
a) Eradication of Poverty 
The high concentration of poverty in middle-income 
countries may suggest that donors’ attention should 
be placed on those countries. However, aid should be 
conceived as a mechanism geared towards boosting 
and supplementing the capacity of countries to 
address their own problems. From this perspective, 
what is truly relevant is not the actual number of 
poor people in a given country, but rather that 
country’s capacity to address its own poverty. Based 
on this viewpoint, available data confirms that poorer 
countries are those which are in most need of aid.
In fact, within a broad group of MICs, there is 
the chance that these countries address poverty 
eradication action by themselves. In such cases, aid 
should not be offered to replace such responsibility. 
Even so, aid could play a role (a smaller one) by 
supporting social and distribution policies aimed 
at fighting poverty, promoting their design through 
technical assistance and the exchange of experiences. 
 
Within the middle-income group there are 
also countries that have limited fiscal space for 
redistributive action, which makes it really difficult 
for them to assume the goal of eradicating poverty 
by themselves and in the short term. In those cases, 
international aid may be a necessary complement. 
b) The Middle-Income Traps
Persistency of poverty is just one of the many 
problems y middle-income countries face. These 
countries also have structural deficiencies and 
imbalances which often threaten the sustainability 
of their development paths: these are the so-called 
“middle-income traps”. Such problems particularly 
affect those countries’ governance conditions within 
a context of high inequality and social fragmentation, 
difficulties in their international financial integration 
preserving, at the same time, their macroeconomic 
stability; these are shortcomings in making required 
changes in their energy patterns without affecting 
their convergence process, or, reducing their ability 
to maintain a continuous path of productive and 
technological change and improvement in the living 
standards.
International development cooperation can 
help countries avoid these traps. The impact of 
development cooperation will probably not be 
the same in all cases.. For example, it may have 
a significant effect on the lack of social cohesion 
or the low quality of institutions. It can also have 
a role in promoting technological innovation 
and productive change, as well as in encouraging 
transformation in the energy model. Finally, it may 
have a minor relevance for a third group of issues, 
such as increasing the room for counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies.
c) Promoting International
Cooperative Action 
The reasons that justify cooperation with MICs 
are associated not only with the need to overcome 
internal problems this type of countries face, but 
also with the support to their efforts to become 
more actively involved in dealing with common 
problems on a global scale. It is about assuming a 
new conception of the “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” principle, giving more active 
participation to those Southern countries with 
higher levels of development particularly upper 
(middle-income countries) within a more committed 
collective action on a global scale. One of the tasks 
of development cooperation should be to create 
the conditions and provide incentives so that this 
involvement is effective in contributing to fairer 
global governance.
4.- aId allocatIon and country 
graduatIon
In some cases, the withdrawal of aid from middle-
income countries is motivated by the existence of 
country eligibility and graduation systems which 
are based on per capita GDP. However, this is a very 
inadequate criterion for aid allocation: on the one 
hand, because it fails to consider all the relevant 
aspects required for diagnosing a country; on the 
other hand, because it is based on an average which 
often does not adequately reflect the diversity of 
situations that can be found within a single country. 
This is particularly relevant in the case of MICs, 
which are characterized by a remarkable internal 
heterogeneity in their productive, social and regional 
spheres. 
Besides, the very logic of graduation is controversial, 
as it creates problems both in terms of equity and 
incentives within aid policies. It affects equity 
because it subjects a reality that is continuous by 
nature –this is, the development level of countries- 
to a dichotomous logic: eligible versus non-eligible. 
And, with regards to incentives, it is problematic 
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because withdrawing aid from countries making 
progress does not help promote their national 
development efforts. Beyond these aspects, the 
fact that several donors apply the same graduation 
criterion (for example, recipient’s upgrade to the 
middle-income category), may lead to a simultaneous 
and uncoordinated withdrawal of resources, thereby 
affecting a country’s conditions for stability and 
progress. 
Therefore, if we want to establish eligibility and 
graduation criteria, these should be built through 
a process: first, they should be based on a broad 
range of indicators, so that they offer a rich and 
comprehensive view of a country’s situation; second, 
these criteria should not incorporate perverse 
incentives to the system; and, third, they should be 
accompanied by alternative cooperation mechanisms 
for candidates to graduation, in establishing a set of 
follow-up criteria for their transition period, in order 
to ensure that aid withdrawal does not entail serious 
costs for the affected country.
This is important in connection with the EU’s new 
development policy, which is laid down in the 
document, Increasing the impact of EU Development 
Policy: An Agenda for Change (2011). This policy 
adopts the differentiation criterion, including a 
graduation process for access to grants for a large 
number of countries. The arguments used to 
support these decisions are based on the search 
for a greater degree of selectivity in international 
action, identification of the added value offered 
by Community cooperation and complementarity 
with the development policies of member states. 
It is difficult to refute the relevance of such goals: 
however, the proposal is liable to attract some 
criticism, for three reasons at least: i) it gives 
too much weight to per capita GDP as a factor to 
determine a country’s eligibility and graduation; 
ii) in order to define priorities, it resorts to country 
categories which are highly heterogeneous; and 
iii) there is  insufficient clarity as to the alternative 
support mechanisms that would assist graduated 
countries, and it includes no design of a transition 
and subsequent follow-up phase for the graduated 
country.
5.- agenda for cooperatIon 
WIth MIddle-IncoMe countrIes
Cooperation with MICs should be used to meet two 
major goals: to help countries overcome the obstacles 
that hinder their development (tackle the middle-
income traps), and to support their efforts to assume 
a more central role in international cooperative 
action.
a) Overcoming Middle-Income Traps
Although MICs face various problems, most of them 
can be classified into three large areas: governance, 
economic stability and productive transformation.
The first trap refers to the country’s governance 
conditions. As countries make progress, they 
require increasingly complex institutions, capable 
of dealing with coordination issues inherent to 
the more developed economies, and able to meet 
the needs of more demanding societies. Both 
processes do not always occur at the same pace, and 
frequently, advances in economic and social areas 
are not accompanied by a parallel renovation of the 
institutional framework, thus creating a problem 
that may affect the sustainability of the development 
process. 
In many cases, the problem lies not only in the 
weakness and limited efficiency of institutions, but 
also in their reduced credibility, which is fueled 
by the extraordinary levels of inequality and the 
social/regional fragmentation that is typical of some 
middle-income countries.
In this context, strengthening the institutional 
framework and improving social cohesion should 
be one of the key work areas for international 
cooperation. The aim should be not only to improve 
institutional efficiency, but also their ability to 
articulate collective action, which necessarily leads 
to factors connected with institutional credibility and 
legitimacy. 
The second problem area is the effect of countries’ 
increasing integration into the international financial 
markets under the conditions of macroeconomic 
stability required for sustainable growth. In this 
case, the mobilization of national resources, the 
encouragement of savings, broader opportunities 
to design counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies 
and the correction of existing asymmetries in the 
international financial markets are crucial.
Development cooperation plays a limited role in 
solving these issues. Most of them remain the 
responsibility of national governments, leaving 
international cooperation to fulfill the function 
of providing technical assistance and exchanging 
experiences, if required. Some donors have a greater 
capacity for action in the sphere of international 
financial regulation, influencing international 
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economic governance bodies (such as the G-20). 
A third group of problems is associated with the 
difficulty MICs have in maintaining a process of 
productive and technological change to sustain 
their development path. As per capita income levels 
rise, salary costs increase and economies must 
move toward more dynamic specializations, which 
involves applying greater technological capabilities 
and more qualified human resources. Environmental 
imperatives have set new constraints to these 
processes, calling for changes in existing energy and 
production models. Countries do not always have the 
required capacities to promote such changes, and so 
they are caught in one specialization that does not 
allow them to make their productivity grow at the 
right pace, thus preventing the sustainability of their 
convergence process. 
Within this sphere, the role of development 
cooperation is limited, but not irrelevant. This 
is especially true if we consider development 
cooperation beyond what is strictly reportable as 
ODA. There are six fields in which cooperation can 
be deployed: i) supporting innovative enterprises; ii) 
supporting the promotion of technological capacities 
and knowledge transfer; iii) promoting sustainable 
energy models; iv) improving infrastructures; v) 
supporting the training of skilled manpower; and 
vi) defining a regulatory framework to enhance 
technological and business dynamism. 
b) Promoting Cooperative Action at a 
Global Scale
The second purpose of cooperation with middle-
income countries is to support and strengthen the 
role of these countries at an international level, 
so they can take on increasing responsibility and 
decision-making power in overall governance. This 
goal can be seen in four main areas.
First, in support to South-South cooperation. The 
existence of this modality challenges the strictly dual 
vision of cooperation (donors versus recipients) that 
was predominant in the past, making it clear that 
tackling inequalities is now a shared task to which 
all countries are called to contribute, based on their 
respective capacities.
It would be reasonable for traditional donors to 
back up the efforts of MICs to create an efficient and 
technically solid South-South cooperation system, 
by supporting the institutions in charge of such 
policies. Through triangular cooperation, traditional 
donors can become involved in more active support 
to South-South cooperation, amplifying the available 
resources. Likewise, donors may support cooperation 
initiatives at a regional scale, by promoting 
cooperative action and mutual learning mechanisms 
at this level. Finally, the increased presence of 
non-DAC donors in the cooperation system should 
entail a review of the system’s governance structures, 
opting for those which are more inclusive and 
representative.
Second, middle-income countries have a leading role 
in regional integration schemes. This role results 
from the size and, in some cases, from the dynamism 
of said countries, which create major externalities 
within their regional environment. Some donors 
have found in such effects a reason to maintain their 
cooperation with certain MICs (sometimes referred 
to as “anchor countries”). 
Cooperation should support these initiatives, 
particularly in three areas. First, by enhancing the 
human and technical capabilities of the institutions 
in charge of integration processes; second, by 
promoting experiences of inter-governmental policy 
coordination within the region, so as to build a 
culture of trust and joint work between partners; 
last, by supporting initiatives geared towards 
improving inter-country connectivity, particularly 
those linked with improvements in their physical and 
communication infraestructure.
Third, MICs have, given their weight and dynamism, 
a relevant role in the provision of regional and global 
public goods; they are also among the most affected 
countries when their provision is  insufficient. The 
international community should establish some 
support mechanisms for middle-income countries 
to offset part of the costs they incur in the provision 
of international public goods, encouraging them to 
adopt a more committed role in the management of 
common problems. This task is particularly criticalin 
the case of regional public goods, whose provision 
depends on the actions of the countries in question.
One last sphere in which development cooperation 
policy should be applied is in connected with 
the effect of other policies –other than aid- on 
the prospects for progress. For many MICs, the 
importance of aid is relatively low; and, conversely, 
as they are highly integrated in the international 
market, these countries are highly affected by donors’ 
policies. This explains why one of the essential 
aspects of cooperation policy with these countries 
is to improve the levels of coherence in terms of 
policies. Thus, in an increasingly global world, policy 
coherence is not a goal that can be confined to the 
domestic sphere: it should also affect the totality of 
the regulatory frameworks for international relations.
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6- InstruMents and actors
Given the kinds of problems which MICs face,  
cooperation policy design should have some specific 
traits. In this regard, three general guidelines seem 
relevant: i) first, action should be highly selective 
and strategic, identifying the core issues in each 
country which obstruct the path towards progress, 
and those in which cooperation may be effective; ii) 
second, given the internal heterogeneity of countries, 
we should consider the need to adopt sub-national 
perspectives when it comes to designing actions; and 
iii) finally, due to its limited weight, the role of aid 
will consist in modifying the incentive framework 
within which agents operate, while additional 
instruments other than ODA may prove crucial in 
these countries. 
As a result, the planning of interventions in middle-
income must be highly context-specific. It requires a 
prior rigorous effort involving diagnosis and dialogue 
with the recipient country, a strategic ability to define 
actions in a very selective way, specialized technical 
capacity to address the specific requirements on 
which to focus interventions, and a broad vision to 
identify the most appropriate actors and instruments 
(sometimes beyond those predominantly reported as 
ODA).
In terms of modalities, the advantages of program-
based aid, on the grounds of its greater predictability, 
may be useful for MICs, although in these cases 
instruments which are either highly intensive in 
financial resources (e.g.: budgetary support), or are 
highly intrusive in the recipient’s decision-making 
process (e.g.: sector-wide support) will be less 
relevant. 
For middle-income countries, technical cooperation, 
associated to institutional strengthening, deployment 
of recipient’s technical capacities and policy design 
is very important. However, technical cooperation 
should overcome some of its typical limitations, 
putting more emphasis on the development of 
local capacities instead of being a  mere transplant 
of donor’s capacities; this implies cooperation 
aimed at strengthening institutional capacities, less 
dependent on expatriate technical staff and more 
sensitive toward knowledge applicability under local 
conditions.
Due to the type of actions proposed, it is essential 
for middle-income countries to rely on cooperation 
instruments operating beyond ODA, many of 
which are linked to the presence of new actors 
–like the private sector- within the cooperation 
system. Work in the areas of enterprise promotion, 
investment on infrastructure, support to innovation 
and technological capacities or business financing 
requires instruments which are only partly reportable 
as ODA. The new financial mechanisms are a part 
of this new arsenal of instruments. Cooperation 
managers should pay special attention to the 
possibilities offered by these new mechanisms.
As in other cases, cooperation with MICs involves 
multiple actors. Still, there are three specific aspects 
that must be stressed. First, in view of the social 
fragmentation of many countries, it is important to 
work with an organized civil society, supporting its 
tasks of advocacy and demand to public authorities, 
in order to promote change. Additionally, NGOs may 
play a key role for the access to services by the most 
marginal sectors, thus supplementing public policies.
Second, considering various cooperation fields of 
activity, it is important to involve specialized actors 
with very specific technical competences, many of 
whom are not frequently engaged in development 
cooperation. Knowledge and trust-based 
relationships to involve these actors in development 
interventions may not always exist, and so it requires 
additional efforts on the part of public sector 
managers.
Finally, in view of the greater proximity between 
donor and recipient, and the diversity of the actors 
involved, it is essential to deploy a more horizontal, 
networked activity, by adding up the capabilities and 
expertise of the various actors. In these cases, official 
agencies should give up their former role as service 
providers, in order to become mediators, to identify 
problems, talk to those involved, create the necessary 
conditions to lay down a network of cooperative 
response, and define incentives (including financial 
incentives) to ensure the efficiency of such 
coordinated action.
To sum up, all of this suggests that it is vital to 
maintain support to MICs that face difficulties, 
but the contents and implementation methods of 
this support should be very different than those 
traditionally applied in the cooperation with poorer 
countries.
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Although with some delay, the current economic 
crisis has ended up having a negative impact on 
the flows of international aid. According to DAC 
data, official development assistance (ODA) flows 
dropped by 2.7% in 2011 and by 4% in 2012. This 
fall is not limited to a small number of countries in 
difficulty; instead, it is a highly generalized trend 
among donors. In fact, 8 out of the 23 bilateral 
donors cut their aid in 2010, going up to 16 in 
2011, and 14 in 2012. This trend is a result of the 
severity of the crisis and the magnitude of the fall 
in tax revenues seen in a large number of donor 
countries, who have not only reduced their available 
resources, but have also decreased the weight of aid 
within among governmental priorities (and those 
of public opinion). Under these circumstances, it is 
reasonable to worry about the future of aid, and the 
interest in the appropriate allocation of available 
resources in order to increase their effectiveness, 
while new financial mechanisms and new partners in 
development promotion are sought. It is necessary 
to re-think the cooperation system, to adapt it to an 
environment characterized by financial restrictions, 
which will probably be prolonged: the reflections in 
this document should be framed within this context, 
although the proposal which is put forward differs 
from those suggested by some donors. 
The crisis has interrupted a remarkable period of 
growth and reform of aid, which took place, with 
some interruptions, during the 2000s. In fact, it 
was at the end of that decade when aid reached its 
maximum peak in actual terms, channeling 128 
billion dollars (up from barely 79 billion in 2000). As 
resources increased, an active agenda was initiated 
in order to review the procedures applied by donors, 
so as to improve the levels of aid effectiveness and 
quality. The 2005 Paris Declaration, the 2008 Accra 
Agenda for Action and the Global Partnership for 
Development Cooperation Effectiveness of Busan in 
2011 are the major milestones of that process.  The 
basis of these agreements is the search for a two-fold 
objective: to reduce aid transaction costs (through 
greater donor specialization and coordination), 
and to impose a certain balance in the relationship 
between donor and partner countries (insisting on 
the ownership of development processes). 
However, the level of success in reaching these 
goals has been limited, as evidenced by the external 
assessments of the Paris Agenda (OECD, 2011); still, 
the efforts made to reform the aid system cannot 
be denied. The problem is that the international 
context changed more quickly and intensively 
than the cooperation system itself. The increasing 
heterogeneity of the developing world, the changes 
in the global geography of poverty, the emergence 
of new international powers from the South, the 
expansion of space for international public goods, 
the deterioration of environmental conditions and 
the presence of new actors in the cooperation system 
pose significant challenges which shall determine the 
future of the development cooperation system.
Changes in the doctrinal framework were 
accompanied by a modification of the geographical 
distribution of aid. Encouraged by the 
recommendations of the Paris Agenda, many donors 
reduced the number of countries in which they 
operate, selecting as preferential partners those 
with a lower income, or considered fragile states 
(a category not recognized by the UN). As a result, 
low-income countries (LICs), especially those in Sub-
Saharan Africa, have become the main aid recipients 
over the last decade, while middle-income countries 
(MICs) significantly reduced their relative presence 
in overall ODA. The process was significant enough 
so as to exclude MICs from the aid expansion process 
of the previous decade.
This can be seen more clearly in the decision by 
some donors in recent years to leave these countries 
and close any delegations they had there. This 
has mainly affected Latin American countries, 
1. INTRODUCTION:
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a region composed almost entirely by MICs. 
The European Union itself adopted this form of 
action through its communication, Increasing the 
impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for 
Change 1,in which it defines a graduation system 
for upper middle-income countries (and some 
lower middle-income countries) in terms of access 
to grants, which entails a considerable reduction 
in concessional funds available for this type of 
countries. Additionally, graduation systems based 
on per capita GDP in many international institutions 
and programs will intensify the impact of resource 
withdrawal on MICs.  
Change in aid allocation may seem to be in line 
with the dynamism which emerging market MICs 
have acquired in the international sphere. Indeed, 
it is actually within that broad and heterogeneous 
group where the most dynamic poles of the last 
decade’s global economy can be found; and this 
prominent role is expected to continue in the near 
future. It appears as if the success reached by some 
of these dynamic economies has rendered aid almost 
dispensable for the stratum to which they belong. 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that such 
successful behavior can be generalized to the entire 
group of MICs; or that the economic circumstances 
of the last decade, which lead to faster growth, will 
be sustainable in the near future. A considerable 
number of MICs suffer from severe structural 
deficiencies which threaten their development 
processes; and some of those countries have 
experienced bottlenecks in their progress dynamics 
as a consequence of serious problems experienced in 
their internal transformation processes and in their 
forms of international integration. It is within these 
environments where the so-called middle-income 
traps emerge, which, even though they differ from 
those found in poorer countries, equally block their 
respective development processes. In these cases, 
development cooperation can make a difference, by 
helping those countries overcome their structural 
weaknesses and consolidate their development 
achievements. 
For this reason, we must assume that development 
policy should adopt a broad and comprehensive 
approach, going beyond the mere fight against 
extreme poverty. Such an approach, without 
questioning the basic principle of distributive 
progressiveness that characterizes aid (giving more 
to those who have less), also reserves some support 
for the most vulnerable MICs. In these countries, 
cooperation should be more selective, attempting to 
define incentives for change, combining instruments 
apart from ODA. In sum, the cooperation system 
should be willing to take on different agendas, resort 
to various instrument combinations, and to operate 
with scopes broader than ODA, adapting itself to 
the conditions and needs of recipient countries. The 
developing world is now more heterogeneous than 
in the past, and the development cooperation system 
should be prepared to deal with such diversity.
Maintaining support to MICs is more relevant if we 
consider that the number of countries which belong 
to the low-income stratum is increasingly low, and 
the number of poor people residing in middle-income 
countries is higher. According to the World Bank’s 
classification (2013), only 36 countries belong to 
the low-income group, while 103 countries (85% of 
the developing world’s population) belong to the 
middle-income category. Furthermore, said group of 
countries contains two thirds of the global population 
living with less than 1.25 dollars a day (a similar 
conclusion is obtained in the case of 2 dollars as the 
poverty line). These data suggest, first of all, that 
eradicating extreme poverty today is more feasible 
than it was ever before, as the number of people 
living in extreme poverty has decreased, and more 
resources are available to the countries in which 
these people live; but, secondly, that such a goal 
could be hard to reach if they are left unattended and 
international support is withdrawn from MICs with 
high poverty levels and severe vulnerabilities. 
In any event, this contribution is necessary if we 
seek to enhance the provision of international 
public goods. Some of them are crucial to obtain 
development achievements and to preserve safety 
and progress conditions in the international stage 
(think, for example, of climate change). MICs 
are called to play a prominent role in this field, 
from a two-fold perspective: on the one hand, as 
key contributors to the provision of this type of 
goods, and as major affected parties in the event 
of their under-provision, on the other. This double 
implication emphasizes the dual role which these 
countries should play in the international system, 
both as countries deserving support, but also as 
active contributors to the solution of global problems.
This dual role in the development cooperation 
sphere is confirmed through the increasing boom of 
South-South cooperation. More and more MICs are 
becoming involved in active cooperation programs 
with other developing countries. Apart from the 
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the regions. Brussels, 2011.  http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/documents/agenda_for_change_
es.pdf (last review: 29/09/2013)
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additional resources entailed, what is most relevant 
about this cooperation modality is the sense of 
involvement and shared responsibility in certain 
development activities promoted between countries 
which are not typical OECD donors. At the same 
time, it encourages healthy competition within the 
cooperation system, by providing styles, ways of 
doing and priorities that do not always match those 
of traditional donors. 
Finally, in addition to the presence of new official 
donors, there has been an expansion in the number 
of actors operating in the development cooperation 
system, especially as a result of the involvement of 
those coming from the private sector (companies 
and foundations), who sometimes operate through 
instruments which are not strictly reportable as ODA. 
This also involves incorporating new cultures and 
ways of working in the system, which are influencing 
traditional approaches to aid. This increasing 
richness and complexity of cooperation policies is 
particularly relevant for MICs, where non-traditional 
aid system actors should operate, and where ODA, 
in its traditional sense, will become less important, 
to the benefit of other potential cooperation 
instruments. 
In sum, over the last two decades there have been 
major changes both in the international sphere and 
in the international aid system. MICs are in the 
limelight of many of these changes. For this reason, 
it is important for donors to reassess their position 
with regard to this group of countries: greater donor 
involvement in these countries would have a two-
fold impact. Firstly, it would allow for cooperation 
to respond more fully to the new configuration of 
the international system, and deal with the fact that 
most of the developing (and poor) population lives 
in MICs. Secondly, it would allow for cooperation 
that is more horizontal, incentive-based, comprising 
multiple actors and resorting to various instruments, 
beyond those offered by the ODA. To a certain extent 
this anticipates what development cooperation of the 
future should look like, that which seems to be taking 
shape in the recent agreements by the IV High Level 
Forum of Aid Effectiveness of Busan. Therefore, 
the question here is to re-think the cooperation 
system we want for the future, taking into account 
the change trends observed in the international 
system. Which are those trends? What reasons justify 
cooperation with MICs? What is the most suitable 
agenda for this type of countries? How should we 
implement cooperation and what is the role of 
different actors? These are some of the questions for 
which this document intends to provide answers. 
This document is divided into six sections, in 
addition to this introduction. Section two analyzes 
the change trends in the international system; section 
three presents the reasons to justify cooperation with 
MICs; section four deals with the appropriateness of 
basing aid allocation on country classification and 
graduation criteria, with  a specific reference made to 
the EU; section five discusses the agenda for MICs; 
section six includes some observations concerning 
the implementation of cooperation and the role of 
actors in this type of countries; finally, section seven 
outlines some brief conclusions.
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2.1. IncreasIng heterogeneIty In 
the developIng World
Development theory was born in the 1950s, based on 
the assumption that developing countries made up 
a relatively homogeneous reality, different to that of 
developed countries. International aid was founded 
on a similar idea, which also implied assuming the 
existence of a large gap between the North and the 
South (the North-South divide). Nowadays, reality 
is quite different: heterogeneity in the developing 
world has increased significantly, while countries 
are occupying a broader (and continuous) scale of 
development levels.
The increase in the developing world’s heterogeneity
can be observed in the dispersion parameters and 
in the very shape of the standardized distribution 
function of per capita income (Alonso, 2012 and 
2013, Alonso and Ocampo, 2012). As a consequence, 
the very term developing countries is less meaningful 
than before, as it refers to a set of quite differentiated 
national realities. In fact, the distance between some 
developing countries and high-income countries is 
smaller than the gap existing with other countries 
within their same group. By way of example, the 
per capita income of Portugal (OECD high-income 
country) in purchasing power parity terms is 1.35 
times greater than Argentina’s (MIC); but the latter 
has a per capita income that is 15 times greater than 
As noted earlier, although the cooperation system has evolved, the 
world has changed much more. Many of those transformations have 
helped emphasize the role that MICs (the “world’s middle class”, so to 
speak) are called to play in the international –and cooperation–system 
over the immediate future. Therefore, it is worth reviewing those 
trends, four of which are listed below. 
2. CHANGES IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES POPULATION (%) GNI PPP (%) RATIO OF GNI PER CAPITA IN 
PPP BETWEEN RICHEST AND 
POOREST COUNTRY IN EACH 
GROUPING
1990 2000 2010 2012 1990 2000 2010 2012 1990 2000 2010 2012 1990 2000 2010 2012
Low Income 49 63 35 36 57,88 40,62 11,92 12,01 1,1 1,1 1,3 1,4 6,52 8,07 7,03 6,38
Lower Middle-Income 56 54 56 48 11,91 33,80 35,99 35,58 8,8 9,0 11,3 11,6 5,22 3,52 5,23 4,51
Upper Middle Income 38 38 54 55 8,68 10,69 35,73 33,93 17,8 21,6 28,8 30,4 2,90 3,83 3,50 3,77
Middle-Income 94 92 110 103 20,58 44,48 71,70 69,51 26,6 30,5 40,1 41,9 14,79 7,61 14,01 12,78
High income 40 53 71 75 15,45 14,92 16,38 18,48 72,3 68,5 58,9 57,2 2,15 2,03 3,36 4,30
TOTAL 183 208 216 214 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100 100 100 100 95,93 74,48 205,97 180,97
TABLE 1. CHANGES IN WORLD BANK CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES
Source: prepared by author based on World Bank data     
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Zambia’s (even though this is also a MIC) and 43 
times greater than Burundi’s (LICs). Additionally, 
the ratio between the most and the least developed 
countries in the high-income category is barely 3 
to 1; but that same ratio is 35 to 1 in the case of the 
developing world.
One consequence of this process can be seen in the 
country classification method used by the World 
Bank2. The low-income category has significantly 
decreased, in such a way that it included only 35 
countries in 2010, representing 11% of the world’s 
population (1.3% of aggregate GDP in purchasing 
power parity terms), while the heterogeneous 
middle-income group included 110 countries, making 
up 72% of global population (44% of aggregate GDP) 
(Table 1). In the last correction, in 2013, the number 
of LICs was 36, and MICs amounted to 103. This 
means that the bulk of countries and population 
of the developing world are located in the middle-
income group.
The need to deal with such heterogeneity constitutes 
a challenge for the development cooperation system. 
In principle, two alternative options are possible: 
either to turn aid into a policy that is increasingly 
focused on fighting extreme poverty, with an agenda 
specializing in this goal and aimed exclusively at 
poorer countries; or, alternatively, to maintain an 
integral perspective for all developing countries, 
working with differentiated agendas based on the 
circumstances of each affected country, including 
those MICs with severe vulnerabilities. Many donors 
appear to favor the first option, but –as noted further 
on– there are good reasons to opt for the second one.
2.2. the neW dIstrIbutIon 
patterns of poverty
The MDGs encouraged changes in the patterns of aid 
allocation: donors tried to target their resources in 
a more focalized manner towards poorer countries, 
2 The World Bank sorts countries into three income strata. The most recent classification (2013) sets down the following thresholds: low-
income (per capita GNI lower than $1,035), middle-income (per capita GNI between $1,036 and $12,615), and high-income (per capita 
GNI over $12,616). In turn, given the heterogeneity of the middle-income stratum, the latter was divided in two: lower middle-income (per 
capita GNI between $1,036 and $4,085) and higher middle-income (per capita GNI between $4,086 and $12,615).
NOT ADJUSTED BY BASE YEAR ADJUSTED BY BASE YEAR
1990 2007 1990 2007
Millions % Millions % Millions % Millions %
LIC 1,596.1 94.5% 305.3 24.1% 1,632.5 93.1% 342.7 29.1%
MIC 93.2 5.5% 960.4 75.9% 121.4 6.9% 836.0 70.9%
Total 1,689.3 100% 1,265.7 100% 1,753.9 100% 1,187.7 100%
China and India 1,137.9 67.4 673.0 53.2 1,123.6 64.1 561.3 47.6
MICs without China 
and India
- 287.4 22.7 274.6 23.3
LIC without China 
and India
458.2 27.1 509.0 29.0
TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF GLOBAL POVERTY (1.25 DOLLARS/DAY)
1990-93 1998-2000 2006-08 2009-2010
LLDC 31,8 32 35,1 46,6
LIC 10,2 12,5 17,2 16
LMIC 49,4 47,1 39,7 28,9
UMIC 8,6 8,5 7,9 8,5
TABLE 2: AID ALLOCATION BY INCOME LEVEL  (%)
Source: DAC (OECD), DAC Statistical Tables  
Source: Sumner (2012)
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significantly reducing the share formerly held by 
MICs (in particular, those of lower middle-income) 
(Table 2). This new resource allocation seems to be in 
line with the redistributive nature of aid, but does not 
correlate with the new location patterns of poverty on 
a global scale.
In fact, if one observes the evolution of poverty 
over the last two decades, two facts stand out. First, 
there has been a significant reduction in the number 
of people living with less than 1.25 dollars a day. 
Although there are some discrepancies in terms of 
figures, all estimates coincide in this trend (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2012; Chandy and Gertz, 2011). Indeed, 
for 2015 (target year for achieving the MDGs), 
forecasts estimate that the number of absolute poor 
will be 600-1,000 million (this is, 10% to 16% of the 
world’s population)3 . Bearing in mind that in 1990 
(baseline year for the MDGs), poverty affected 43% 
of the world’s population, we can understand the 
significance of the progress made up to now. And, 
most importantly, everything seems to indicate that 
the trend towards the reduction of absolute poverty 
will be maintained over the fifteen years (Kharas and 
Rogerson, 2012).
It is interesting to observe that, while the volume of 
absolute poverty has decreased, this is not the case 
with relative poverty, which is highly conditioned by 
distributive patterns within each country. The weight 
of national factors in determining this indicator 
causes its measurement to lack comparability on 
a global scale (a relatively poor person in Sweden 
may be a wealthy individual in Burundi). To tackle 
this problem, while also considering country 
heterogeneity, the concept of weakly relative poverty 
was defined, which considers an absolute minimum 
sum that is required to live, but also contemplates 
poverty thresholds adapted to the circumstances of 
each country (Chen and Ravallion, 2012, Ravallion 
and Chen, 2011)4 . So, the number of people affected 
by weakly relative poverty has barely changed over 
time (2.4 billion in 1990 and 2.7 in 2008), while the 
share of this group in the overall world population 
has declined (from 65% to 47%). Therefore, we are 
heading toward a world with less absolute poor, but 
where relative poverty is persistently high.
The second relevant fact is the new location of poor 
people in relation to country income levels. More 
precisely, using World Bank data for 2008, Sumner 
(2010, 2012) confirms that two thirds of the world’s 
absolute poor (around 1 billion people) live in MICs, 
while the remaining third (approx. 300 million) are 
located in LICs (Table 3). This geographical pattern 
is entirely new, since in 1990, 94% of absolute poor 
lived in low-income countries. This assessment is 
not modified much if instead of measuring poverty 
through the available economic resources, we refer 
to other parameters connected with peoples’ living 
standards. Thus, for example, nearly 70% of the 
global burden of disease (measured through the 
disability-adjusted-life-year, DALY) concentrates 
in MICs, with 21% in LICs and 8% in high-income 
countries (HICs) (Glassman et al, 2011, Salvado and 
Waltz, 2013).
This change in poverty location was influenced 
decisively by the graduation into middle-income 
status of several developing countries with very 
FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF GLOBAL POVERTY IN MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
3 The most optimistic estimation corresponds to Chandy and Gertz (2011), with 600 million, while the one by Chen and Ravallion (2012) 
amounts to 1000 million.
4 To make the difference clear: an increase in average income, without altering the country’s internal distribution, would leave relative 
poverty unmodified, but would reduce the “weakly” relative poverty.
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REGIONS AND 
COUNTRIES
NUMBER OF 
COUNTRIES
PERCENTAGE 
OF REGION'S 
POPULATION (%)
PERCENTAGE OF 
REGION'S GNI 
(PPP)
SHARE OF 
REGIONAL 
GROWTH
LATIN AMERICA AND 
CARIBBEAN
BRAZIL 33 32,3 33
MEXICO 19.2 23.5 14.7
TOTAL 33 52.3 55.8 47.7
NORTH AFRICA
EGYPT
TOTAL 5 40.9 42.6 44.9
WESTERN AFRICA
NIGERIA 45.8 53.8 60.2
TOTAL 23 45.8 53.8 60.2
EASTERN AFRICA
11
SOUTHERN AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICA 30.3 66.9 55.9
TOTAL 14 30.3 66.9 55.9
WESTERN ASIA
IRAN 35.6 32.2 32.9
TOTAL 13 35.6 32.2 32.9
SOUTH ASIA
INDIA 74.9 82.5 85.4
TOTAL 8 74.9 82.5 85.4
EAST ASIA
CHINA 62.7 55.7 77.5
INDONESIA 10.7 5.2 4.9
TOTAL 17 73.4 61.1 82.4
CENTRAL EUROPE
RUSSIA 40.4 52.9 50.8
TURKEY 20.9 24.9 22
TOTAL 33 52.3 55.8 47.7
Source: World Bank.
TABLE 4: NEW REGIONAL POWERS
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high numbers of poor people (particularly China, 
Indonesia, India, Nigeria and Pakistan). The 
important question is whether the new pattern will 
remain stable over time. Projections do not fully 
coincide in this regard, but those based on reasonable 
criteria suggest that, over the next decade, 40%-60% 
of the world’s poor population will continue to live in 
MICs5 (Figure 1). 
Therefore, the accumulation of poverty is not an 
exclusive problem of LICs: MICs also suffer from it. 
And, although these countries have greater capacities 
than the first group to address the challenge of 
eradicating this scourge, it is not clear whether all of 
them can do it on their own and if they can do it fast 
and effectively enough. Development cooperation can 
contribute to this task, by stimulating and supporting 
these countries’ efforts. 
However, it should be noted that poverty in MICs 
is frequently not usually the result of generalized 
deficiencies but rather it is due to the inequality of 
distribution patterns within a country. In these cases, 
the role of cooperation should not be focused on 
funding the poor’s needs but rather on supporting 
the redistributive and inclusive focus of domestic 
public policies. Reducing poverty will therefore be 
addressed mostly by national policies which are 
less dependent on the direct provision of resources 
from abroad and more focused on combining the 
promotion of growth with the correction of internal 
inequalities. 
2.3. a MultI-polar World
Development assistance began in a bipolar world, 
characterized by the existence of two opposing 
blocks; today, however, that world no longer exists, 
and in its place, a more complex and multi-polar 
world is shaping up. New powers from the developing 
world have emerged; they are highly dynamic and 
have a growing capacity for international projection 
(Spence, 2011). 
Data confirm this idea. Developing countries and 
emerging markets already represent around 52% 
of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity, 
with China, India, Indonesia, Brazil and Russia 
contributing 32% of overall GDP (such shares 
would be 34% and 18%, respectively, if GDP was 
measured at current exchange rates). Additionally, 
that group of countries already represents 42% of the 
global trade flows, in which the exchange between 
developing countries is increasingly prominent. 
Finally, reaffirming their prominent role, a growing 
part of international capital flows go to these 
countries which hold three quarters of the global 
official reserves, and own many of the most active 
sovereign capital funds. 
This change can also be observed upon identifying 
the poles of growth in the global economy. The 
estimation of polarity indices (World Bank, 2011) 
confirms that industrial economies, which promoted 
world growth over the last decades, have been 
replaced by a group of key economies –virtually all of 
them MICs– which have emerged as future centers 
of dynamism in the international economy. Among 
them, China occupies a key position, but the group is 
expanded to include at least India, Brazil, Indonesia, 
Korea, Turkey and Russia (although not all of them 
have a similar dynamism). These economies as a 
group will provide around 45% of aggregate GDP 
in terms of purchasing power parity by 2030 (such 
share would be 32% at current exchange rate) 
(Subramanian 2011). 
This process has another relevant consequence: some 
large-sized MICs have become major growth poles 
in their regions. In virtually all regions of the world 
(maybe with the exception of Eastern Africa), one or 
two countries are accountable for three quarters of 
aggregate regional growth (Table 4). In these cases, 
the progress of such countries is key to ensure the 
sustained dynamism of their regional environment. 
Some donors have selected these countries as priority 
partners, using the “anchor country” concept to 
define the role they play within their regional context 
(BMZ, 2011).
This growing multi-polarity of the international 
system creates the opportunity to build more 
inclusive and democratic governance structures at a 
global scale; to a large extent, because the challenges 
of a multi-polar world require more cooperative 
solutions. However, international evidence reveals 
that this result is neither easy nor spontaneous. The 
behavior of some of these new powers sometimes 
seems more in line with a reproduction of the bipolar 
world of the past than with a sincere adhesion to a 
more democratic and inclusive governance.
In any case, the above-described multi-polarity 
entails a new (and broader) view of “common 
5 The most optimistic estimation was made by Kharas and Rogerson (2012) who place this share somewhere below 20%; Sumner and Mullet 
(2013) increase this share up to 62% and the World Bank (2012) estimates that the proportion could be somewhere around 40%.
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but differentiated responsibilities”: a principle 
that may no longer be  interpreted on the basis 
of a clear division of responsibilities between 
developed and developing countries, but rather as a 
continuum of commitment levels, according to the 
differentiated development levels of each country. 
This interpretation has major implications for the aid 
system, because many of the new powers, together 
with other MICs, have launched aid programs 
aimed at other developing countries through diverse 
forms of South-South cooperation. This is a way 
of applying this new view of the “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” principle, by actively 
involving the most developed Southern countries 
in global governance tasks and in the correction of 
international inequalities. 
2.4. InternatIonal publIc goods6
Globalization has intensified interdependencies and 
externalities between countries, beyond national 
borders. As a result, certain issues that were 
previously exclusive for a given country have now 
become shared issues, which require a cooperative 
effort at a global scale to be solved; at the same 
time, other problems have arisen with a global 
nature from their very origin. It is within this field of 
interdependencies and strong externalities that the 
space inherent to international public goods (IPGs) 
emerges. Although very diverse in nature, these 
goods affect crucial aspects of collective life, such as 
the regulatory framework for international relations 
(treaties, institutions and rights), the actions 
required to reduce collective risks (health, peace and 
the environment, for example) and the conditions 
to encourage progress (knowledge dissemination, 
financial stability or commercial integration, for 
example).
Due to their strong externalities, international 
public goods, once provided, are available for 
everybody without restrictions (the same could be 
said, but with an inverse effect, of public “bads”). 
Consequently, the market by itself is incapable of 
ensuring their efficient provision, and there is a need 
to resort to various forms of collective action. In the 
international sphere, as there is no coercive State, 
this action takes the form of voluntary coordination 
and cooperation between countries. The multilateral 
system is the most appropriate framework to 
promote and articulate this response. However, 
there is a widely held opinion which claims that the 
multilateral system, in its current form, fails to meet 
the right conditions to perform this task effectively. 
Therefore, in order to improve the provision of such 
goods, a reform of the rules and structures of the 
international governance is required.
There is a close relationship between the agendas 
of international public goods and the development 
agenda (Kaul et al., 1999 and 2003, Sandler 2004, 
Alonso 2002). The discovery of vaccines (such as that 
for malaria), the struggle against climate change, 
or the preservation of financial stability (all of these 
being international public goods) can have a greater 
development impact than many international aid 
programs. This does not mean that the traditional 
development agenda should be subsumed to the 
public goods agenda: they are two different, yet 
complementary, agendas. They are different both 
in their theoretical basis and in their distributive 
implications, but both agendas are connected. 
Achievements in the fight against poverty are hard 
to attain unless action is taken within the realm of 
international public goods (peace and safety, global 
health, climate change, financial stability, etc.); at the 
same time, making progress in the provision of these 
goods is difficult unless international inequalities are 
corrected simultaneously (UNIDO, 2008).
The appropriate integration of both agendas poses 
a major challenge for the international cooperation 
system, which must define the financial instruments 
and mechanisms required for each case; and, when 
required, it must set any necessary tradeoffs between 
respective priorities (for example, between economic 
growth and environmental sustainability). MICs 
play a crucial role in this public goods’ agenda, not 
only because they are key agents for the provision 
of a large portion of IPGs, but also because as their 
economies are expanding constantly, they are among 
those most interested in the proper design and 
application of this agenda.
******
As we have seen, the international system is 
undergoing major change trends; these trends are 
expected to remain –or intensify– over time, and are 
reconfiguring the international scene. All of them 
tend to underline the fundamental role which MICs 
are called to play in the development system. Table 5 
offers a summarized image of these implications.
6 International public goods are those goods whose powerful externalities exceed national frontiers. This category comprises cross-border, 
regional and global public goods, depending on the scope of their effects.
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CHANGES IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
GENERAL CONSEQUENCES IMPLICATIONS FOR COOPERATION
WITH MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
Increasing heterogeneity of the 
developing world
Developing countries have very 
differentiated capacities and needs
b) Differentiate agendas and instruments based on each
country’s conditions.
New poverty distribution patterns The war on poverty is a common 
task for all  affected countries
a) Support (not abandon) MICs in their fight against
poverty
b) Assume that the war on poverty also entails
(particularly in MICs) a correction of distribution
patterns
Increasing multi-polarity New sense of the principle 
“common but differentiated 
responsibilities”
a) Support the involvement of MICs in efforts to 
correct international inequalities through South-South 
Cooperation
b) Promote rules and entities for global governance
Growing space for International 
public goods (IPGs)
Need to set agendas and shared 
efforts for common problems
a) Support the active involvement of MICs in the IPG 
agenda
TABLE 5: GLOBAL CHANGE TRENDS:
IMPACT ON MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
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3.1. MaxIMIzIng developMent 
IMpact: an IncentIve-based 
approach
In that regard, the system has two opposing options: 
one is to accept a comprehensive perspective which 
covers a significant part of the developing world, 
with a differentiated agenda based on each country’s 
conditions which enables Southern countries to 
assume common but differentiated responsibilities, 
and connects the development agenda with the 
international public goods’ agenda. The other 
alternative is to turn aid into a policy specializing on 
the fight against extreme poverty, focused on LICs 
(and fragile states), which is very centrally led by 
traditional OECD donors (with minor contributions 
from other donors). 
Some analysts think that the second option is the 
most suitable. Since aid resources are scarce, these 
should be focalized on fighting poverty in poorer 
countries (the Collier’s bottom billion, 2007), 
preventing funds from being scattered over diverse 
purposes or used in certain countries (such as MICs) 
that have greater relative capacities. Implicitly, 
it is assumed that these countries have sufficient 
resources to deal with their own problems by 
themselves, including the eradication of poverty. 
Nevertheless, the above proposal includes some 
questionable aspects. First, it promotes an excessively 
simplistic view of the development agenda, as it fails 
to include goals –other than the struggle against 
extreme poverty – that should also be contemplated 
if one seeks a more equitable and sustainable 
distribution of development opportunities on a global 
scale. Second, it overestimates the capacity of MICs, 
without realizing that many of them suffer from 
serious structural challenges, as well as bottlenecks 
(and even reversals) in their development processes. 
Finally, it fails to realize that the redistributive 
goal, although it is required, should not be the only 
purpose of the cooperation system; this should also 
be geared towards maximizing the development 
efforts made by donors and recipients, by creating 
an appropriate incentive framework. Taking these 
three elements seriously leads to conceiving aid as an 
integral policy, complex and differentiated according 
to each country’s conditions, including those MICs 
with severe vulnerabilities. 
In abstract terms, aid should play a two-fold role: 
it should promote the redistribution of income and 
opportunities for progress globally, and, it should 
introduce incentives to maximize the efforts and 
development achievements of all countries involved. 
Both goals can be compatible, but they are clearly 
distinct. In comparative terms, the first role is more 
relevant in the case of poorer countries, where the 
transfer of aid resources covers a major share of the 
recipient’s social expenses. The second role is the 
most prominent in the case of MICs, where aid is a 
relatively minor source of financing. 
This implies that, in the bulk of MICs, if aid has 
an impact, this is not because of what it finances 
directly. Instead it is a result of the sort of stimuli for 
change it promotes in the affected countries (Kharas 
The need to respond to the previously mentioned changes in the 
international scene poses major challenges for the development 
cooperation system.
3. WHY COOPERATE WITH
MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
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et al., 2011). That is, because of its catalytic, change-
promoting effect. This means that aid should play 
one (or a combination) of these four roles:
• Mobilizing (and leveraging) additional 
resources and capacities, which otherwise 
(in the absence of aid) would be hard to 
mobilize.
• Alleviating some of the restrictions that block 
or hinder change processes in developing 
countries
• Operating as an assurance and risk reduction 
mechanism to face uncertainty. 
• Acting as an incentive, increasing potential 
benefits associated with positive changes for 
development.
3.2. can MIddle-IncoMe 
countrIes address poverty by 
theMselves? 
The high concentration of poverty in middle-income 
countries has led some to wonder if we should not be 
more concerned about helping poor people (wherever 
they live) instead of focusing on assisting poor 
countries. While Collier (2007) insists on the second 
option, in some occasions Sumner (2010) appears to 
suggest the first. If the volume of poor people is what 
matters, then MICs should become the preferential 
recipients of aid. However, this logic is not correct: in 
a world made up by sovereign political communities, 
aid allocation cannot be carried out regardless of 
the capacities that each community has in order to 
deal with its own problems. Aid must be conceived 
as a subsidiary resource which complements and 
stimulates national capabilities, instead of a factor 
used to replace those capacities. 
If this principle is accepted, the relevant issue in 
aid allocation is not so much the number of poor 
population in a given country, but rather the relative 
effort required by that country to eradicate poverty. 
To boost that effort, one must not consider the 
number of existing poor, but rather: i) the relative 
poverty rate, this is, the ratio of poor people to the 
overall population (the headcount ratio); and ii) the 
relative severity of poverty, meaning the distance 
between the poor’s purchasing power and the poverty 
line (the poverty gap). 
This can be seen through an example. Pakistan (a 
middle-income country) has over 37 million people 
living under the poverty line, while in Burkina Faso 
(low-income country) the number of poor people is 
five times smaller, affecting 7.5 million individuals. 
However, with regard to their population, the poor 
make up 44.6% of the overall population in Burkina 
Faso, while in Pakistan that ratio is less than half: 
21%. Therefore, poverty incidence is much greater 
in the African country. This factor is important to 
determine the relative effort required in each case to 
reduce poverty.
It is also necessary to determine the severity of 
poverty, that is, the distance of poor people from 
the poverty line (which is what the poverty gap 
measures). In Burkina Faso this ratio is four times 
greater than in Pakistan (14.7 versus 3.5), which 
means that the effort required to take a person out of 
poverty is, in the first case, four times greater (Chart 
6). If one simultaneously considers the relative 
proportion of the poor and the severity of poverty, 
in connection with the resources of that population 
stratum on which the tax system can operate (usually 
the richest quintile of the population), we will then 
obtain a relative measure of the redistribution effort 
that would be required to eradicate poverty (the 
percentage of the richest people’s income that would 
need to be transferred to the poor in order to raise 
them above the poverty line).  This effort is 16 times 
greater in Burkina Faso than in Pakistan. 
COUNTRY GNI 
(MILLIONS)
POPULATION 
(MILLIONS)
POOR 
POPULATION
POOR AS % 
OF TOTAL 
POPULATION
POVERTY 
GAP
% OF 
INCOME OF 
RICHEST 20% 
NEEDED TO 
ERADICATE 
POVERTY
Pakistan 401,854 167.4 35,229,851 21.04 3.5 0.35
Burkina Faso 17,341 15.9 7,129,077 44.6 14.7 5.71
TABLE 6: RELATIVE EFFORT REQUIRED TO ERADICATE POVERTY
Source: prepared by author based on World Bank, World Development Indicators    
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The points raised in the previous paragraph may 
be generalized to any developing country for which 
there is available data, considering the two most 
widely used poverty lines (1.25 and 2 dollars spent 
per day)7. The application of this criterion reveals 
that LICs present higher ratios (Figures 2a and 2b). 
And so, irrespective of the geographical distribution 
of poverty, if aid intends to support the national 
effort to eradicate this social scourge, the priority of 
LICs in resource allocation is once again confirmed. 
The bulk of aid should be directed towards the poorer 
countries. Nonetheless, this data also indicates 
that some MICs (particularly lower middle-income 
ones) present high ratios (e.g.: Ghana, Republic of 
Congo, Nigeria, India, Pakistan, Zambia or Namibia). 
Abandoning these countries to their fate is a way 
of prolonging the problem, given their inability to 
assume the redistribution effort required to eradicate 
poverty by themselves. In such cases, international 
aid would be justified. 
A similar conclusion is drawn by Ravaillon (2009), 
based on estimations of the marginal tax rate that 
should be applied to the rich population in order 
to finance poverty eradication. To this end, he 
defines “rich population” as that which is above the 
poverty line in any country being considered (that is, 
someone who would not be considered poor based 
on any standards). Next, he estimates the income 
extraction that should be applied to such stratum 
in order to locate the entire poor population above 
the 1.25-dollar line. He calls this ratio the “marginal 
tax rate”. In his study, most MICs have moderate 
marginal tax rates (lower than 25%), revealing 
that there is sufficient space to roll out stronger 
redistribution policies. 
Conversely, most low-income countries present 
marginal rates which are hard to afford (above 
70%), reflecting their limited space for redistributive 
action. Among middle-income countries there are 
FIGURE 2B: REDISTRIBUTION EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY (2 Dollars)
FIGURE 2A: REDISTRIBUTION EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY (1.25 DOLLARS)
7 This must be understood as an approximation, since the cost of eradicating poverty exceeds the mere transfer of resources.
Source: prepared by author based on World Bank, World Development Indicators    
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some cases in which marginal rates present hardly 
affordable values (such as: El Salvador, Honduras, 
Algeria, the Philippines and Indonesia). In fact, for 
lower middle-income countries, marginal rates are 
around 40%, which is quite high (Figure 3). In the 
case of MICs with high demographic density and 
significant contingents of poor population (such as 
India, Nigeria or Pakistan), this ratio may be as high 
as 100%.
In sum, despite the poverty concentration found in 
MICs, LICs should still receive most aid, because they 
have to make a greater effort in order to eradicate 
poverty. In a broad group of MICs, there is the 
possibility –a reasonable possibility depending on 
the relative cost- to assume poverty eradication by 
themselves, for which they will need to reduce the 
existing levels of inequality within their societies. 
In such cases, it is national governments who are 
most responsible for this task, by launching social 
and redistribution policies. Aid cannot be offered 
to replace this responsibility: it does not seem 
reasonable for taxpayers in donor countries to 
contribute to a situation where wealthy segments in 
MICs escape their tax-paying duties8. Nevertheless, 
in these cases aid could play a minor role by 
supporting the relevance of such redistribution 
policies, so that they become a real priority, and by 
facilitating their design through technical assistance 
and the exchange of experiences. 
However, within the middle-income group there are 
some countries for which it would be really difficult 
to eradicate poverty on their own and in the short 
term. These countries have a limited margin for 
redistribution action, because the relative cost of the 
transfers required to lift those affected out of poverty 
is simply too high. In these cases, international aid 
may be required in order to supplement national 
resources and capacities. 
3.3. do MIcs face developMent 
constraInts WhIch 
can be addressed by 
InternatIonal cooperatIon?
The persistency of poverty is just one of the many 
problems which MICs face. These countries also 
confront structural deficiencies and imbalances 
which often threaten the sustainability of their 
development efforts. Their deficiencies are different 
from those of poorer countries (the so-called “poverty 
traps”), but their effects may be equally paralyzing. 
In those cases problems are not so much the result of 
absolute deprivations, but from specific bottlenecks 
faced by the productive and institutional change 
processes for development: this kind of situations 
are called “middle-income traps” (we will return to 
this question later on). These problems, presented 
repeatedly, lead countries to become blocked, 
hindering their convergence towards higher-income 
levels (Aiyar et al., 2013; Agenor and Canuto, 2012; 
Fallon et al., 2001; Alonso, 2007). 
FIGURE 3: MARGINAL TAX RATE NECESSARY TO END POVERTY
Fuente: Chen y Ravaillon (2011)  
8 This is one reason for not considering inequality (or Gini index) as a criterion for aid allocation or the determination of a country’s 
graduation (this will be discussed later on).
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Empirical analysis confirms this view. Many MICs 
experienced periods –sometimes repeated- of 
accelerated economic growth. However, few 
countries have managed to sustain those processes 
and move towards the situation typical of HICs. 
In other cases, such acceleration periods were 
interrupted by severe crisis which affected, in 
particular, those countries’ governance conditions, 
the circumstances of their international financial 
integration and their macroeconomic balance, or 
their possibilities of sustaining a continuous path 
of productive change. In fact, out of 101 middle-
income countries existing in 1960, only 13 managed 
to become high-income countries by 2010 (Agenor et 
al., 2012)9.
A simple illustration of this can be obtained by 
classifying countries on the basis of their relative per 
capita GDP compared with the United States in 1960 
and 2008. Figure 4 classifies countries into several 
groups, according to their dynamic behavior. Thus, 
for example, quadrant 3 includes those countries that 
were high-income in 1960 and still are nowadays 
(a large part of Western Europe, United States and 
Australia); conversely, quadrant 1 shows those which 
were poor in the past and remain poor in the present: 
these countries appear to be caught in poverty traps 
(most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa); quadrant 5 
displays the countries which were originally middle-
income and have now managed to attain high-income 
levels (Spain, Korea, Taiwan and Ireland); quadrant 
4 shows the countries that managed to ascend from 
low to middle income (e.g.: Botswana and Mauricio); 
finally, quadrant 2 shows those countries which 
were originally middle-income and remain so at 
present. This means that they could not implement a 
sustained growth process in their economy to favor 
a transition toward high-income levels. This group 
includes a large number of countries, some of which 
have suffered the effects of middle-income traps.
As noted previously, the fact that a country is caught 
in a middle-income trap does not mean that it has 
not experienced episodes of accelerated growth. For 
example, Figure 5a reflects the evolution of the per 
capita GDP corresponding to three Latin American 
countries (Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina), and 
two European ones (Spain and Ireland). The latter 
two managed to overcome the middle-income trap 
and, during the period, they followed a sustained 
FIGURE 4: POVERTY AND MIDDLE-INCOME TRAPS. A GLOBAL VISION.
9 In the last review by the World Bank of 2013, this list was increased with six countries passing into the high-income country category, 
among others: Chile, Uruguay and Russia.
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process to converge with HICs. However, this trend 
was not sustained in any of the three Latin American 
countries, although some of them experienced 
occasional periods of accelerated growth (such as 
Brazil in 1968-1974 or Argentina in 1955-1960). 
Likewise, Figure 5b shows four countries that have 
not managed to ascend from the middle-income 
status (Iran, Sri Lanka, Philippines and South 
Africa), next to two countries with successful 
convergence dynamics (South Korea and Taiwan). 
Again, the first group’s failure does not mean that 
some of them have not experienced occasional 
accelerated growth (such as Sri Lanka in 1976-1983 
or Iran in 1966-1977). 
Therefore, the problem is not achieving growth, but 
rather maintaining a continuous path of growth and 
social transformation. For this purpose, countries 
need to be able to tackle bottlenecks occurring 
in their process of institutional and productive 
change. International development cooperation 
can contribute, although unevenly, to this task. The 
impact of international aid may be significant in 
overcoming some obstacles --for example, those 
related to the lack of social cohesion or the low 
quality of institutions-; also in a limited but not 
irrelevant way in other cases –e.g.: by promoting 
innovation and technology transfer - and in a minor 
way, to solve a third set of problems– for example, 
the expansion of the space for counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies. 
FIGURE 5A: MIDDLE-INCOME PROGRESS AND TRAPS
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3.4. proMotIng InternatIonal 
cooperatIve actIon for 
coMMon probleMs
The reasons that justify cooperation with MICs are 
connected not only with overcoming the internal 
challenges which affect these countries, but also 
with the support that these countries require to 
be more actively involved in the management of 
common global problems. The increasing presence 
of dynamic powers from the developing world on 
the international scene, together with the increasing 
heterogeneity of this group, implies the need for 
a more shared and modulated distribution of the 
governance responsibilities in the international 
system. A new conception of the “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” principle should 
be adopted; this would actively involve the more 
developed countries in the South (MICs) in a more 
committed cooperative action at a global scale. One 
of the tasks of development cooperation should be to 
create the conditions and establish the incentives for 
that involvement to be effective. 
There are two areas in which this promotion of global 
cooperative action by MICs seems to be particularly 
relevant: the provision of global and regional public 
goods, on the one hand, and the correction of poverty 
and the promotion of international development 
(through the South-South and triangular 
cooperation), on the other. These spheres necessarily 
require the contribution of MICs, if a more inclusive 
and effective global governance structure is to be 
built. Nevertheless, these countries do not always 
find the existing governance structures to be suitable 
to making their voices heard, which would be a 
mandatory condition for them to be more committed 
to undertaking global tasks. At the same time, these 
countries have limited resources and experience 
to deal with those international responsibilities. 
International development cooperation could 
help make the shift towards assuming greater 
international commitments occurs in the best way 
possible, and with the lowest costs for the affected 
country. 
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4.1. country classIfIcatIon
Resorting to GDP as the main criterion for aid 
allocation is clearly debatable. Although it is a 
synthetic indicator for many other factors, per capita 
GDP fails to cover the totality of the relevant aspects 
needed to identify a country’s situation, and the 
average it expresses is frequently not representative 
enough of the diversity of situations within a country. 
This is especially relevant in MICs, as they are 
characterized by a remarkable internal heterogeneity 
in their productive, social and regional spheres. 
Inequality in living conditions is often quite stark, 
depending on social class, region, ethnic group 
or gender; and productivity levels vary according 
to the sector, capital origin or location of a given 
investment. As a result, the country average values 
may conceal the existence of markedly different 
realities; such contrast should be taken into account 
in order to carry out an appropriate diagnosis of a 
country’s development possibilities.
In view of these deficiencies, it is not uncommon 
for many analysts to seek a wider combination of 
indicators to build a more appropriate taxonomy for 
country classification (Tezanos and Sumner, 2011; 
CEPAL, 2012). From the analytical point of view, 
in terms of a rational ordering of highly diverse 
realities, there is nothing to object to these efforts. 
However, extreme caution should be exercised if 
one intends to use these classifications to identify 
development agendas to be prescribed for each 
group, or to derive criteria for aid allocation and 
graduation. 
With regard to setting of development agendas, a 
simple taxonomy, no matter how careful it is, cannot 
possibly identify the diversity of country situations 
and the priorities that should be established in 
each of them. Replacing three large blocks (low, 
middle/low and middle/high income) with five 
or six alternative groups based on a more diverse 
combination of indicators may be useful from an 
analytic standpoint, but it is not likely to respond 
to the actual need to set priorities that development 
cooperation to address. Agenda setting must be 
performed differently for each country, identifying 
the key points of its development process, and 
any bottlenecks to be tackled in each case.  No 
taxonomy can excuse policy-makers from carrying 
out a specific analysis of the particular reality of 
each country; as Hausmann et al., (2004) and 
Haberman and Pradutt (2011) suggest, development 
diagnosis  must be the result of a careful and accurate 
analysis of each national reality. The developing 
world has become increasingly heterogeneous, and 
development cooperation should be prepared to 
As argued in the previous section, there are good reasons to maintain 
an active policy of development cooperation with MICs. However, 
many international donors (both bilateral and multilateral) have 
tended to withdraw from this type of countries. In many cases this 
was a result of applying some formal graduation criteria based on per 
capita GDP; in other cases, it was simply because they placed a high 
value on that indicator in their aid allocation process. 
4. AID ALLOCATION AND
COUNTRY GRADUATION:
THE CASE OF THE EU 
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manage such diversity, by adapting its solutions to 
the circumstances of each case.
In another vein, it would be overly pretentious 
to seek an algorithm that would automatically 
determine the aid allocation process. The idea behind 
this is to reduce discretion and prevent the fallibility 
of policy-makers. However, such an algorithm is 
not easy to build (given the diversity of factors 
to consider), and the mechanical application of a 
numerical criterion does not seem to be a desirable 
objective, given the highly contingent nature of the 
aid allocation process.
In line with its predominantly bilateral character, 
aid allocation is influenced, to varying degrees, by 
factors connected to the identity and interest of the 
respective donors. Recipient’s needs, regardless of 
the way they are measured, also influence decisions, 
given the redistributive nature commonly attributed 
to aid. Finally, a third group of less precise factors 
(such as fashions, mimetic behavior, historical 
inertia, etc.) also affect the resource distribution 
criteria. Studies on aid allocation confirm the 
existence of such a heterogeneous set of factors in the 
donor decision-making process (Neumayer, 2003; 
McGillivray, 1989 and Van der Veen, 2011, among 
others). 
In view of their complexity, it is difficult (and maybe 
not entirely appropriate) to translate all of these 
factors into an algorithm, a sort of precise rule for 
allocation. Given the complexity and fluid nature of 
international reality, it seems appropriate to provide 
adequate margin in the decision-making process 
so that managers can carefully ponder a set of 
changing, and even unforeseen, factors. The purpose 
should not be to use an allocation rule to restrict 
the independent judgment of public authorities, 
but rather to build a basis for them to argue their 
decisions rationally. The identification of technical 
criteria may assist in the decision-making process, 
but not because it exempts managers from their duty 
to decide, but because it enables such decisions to be 
as well-informed as possible.
Recipient’s per capita GDP can be a part of the 
criteria considered for aid allocation, but it should 
never be the only, or the predominant, criterion. 
When seeking supplementary criteria, one should 
avoid those which may act as a source of perverse 
incentives, as these would ultimately affect the 
effectiveness of aid. For example, resources should 
not be allocated based on recipient inequality 
levels, as this would entail supporting those who are 
less concerned with improving their distribution 
patterns; nor it should be granted to compensate the 
weak country´s tax effort, as this would represent a 
disincentive to the creation of a solvent tax system, 
which is nonetheless essential for development.
It is key to seek allocation criteria in line with 
development incentives. When searching for such 
criteria, two groups of factors (not necessarily 
alternative) appear as particularly appropriate. 
First, criteria based on structural vulnerabilities that 
hinder a country’s development and are partially 
beyond the government’s control (this is measured, 
for example, through the economic vulnerability 
index, which is part of the definition criteria for the 
Least Developed Countries, LDC). For example, 
the fact that a country is distant from economic 
activity centers, it is very small in size, does not 
have a diversified production base, or is exposed to 
recurrent natural disasters are issues that reduce 
a country’s possibilities for development, and are 
under the government’s control only to a partial 
extent. In these cases, aid does not generate perverse 
incentives because it is only aimed at partially 
offsetting the disadvantages which affect these 
countries. 
A second type of criteria which does not create 
perverse incentives are those connected to the 
recipient’s development efforts, in such a way that 
aid rewards and encourages positive behavior. For 
example, aid should not be granted on the basis of 
existing inequality, but it could be granted based on 
the effort made by the government to correct such 
inequality (measured through the content of its 
public policies, for instance). In this last case, what 
is important for the criteria is to be associated with 
efforts and achievements in terms of development, 
and not with the type of policies applied, as this 
would unduly restrict the autonomy of recipient 
governments (by imposing an implicit type of 
conditionality).
4.2. the costs of graduatIon
A number of donors (particularly multilateral 
ones) have established clear criteria to determine 
a country’s eligibility or subsequent graduation in 
the access to resources. Within those criteria, per 
capita GDP usually occupies a central position, a 
donor sets a per capita income threshold beyond 
which the country is no longer entitled to receive any 
more resources. Such behavior, raising legitimate 
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complaints from many MICs, has some drawbacks 
worth considering. 
The very logic of graduation is controversial, as 
it creates problems both in terms of equality and 
incentives within aid policies. It affects equality 
because it subjects a reality that is continuous 
in nature –this is, the level of development of 
countries– to a dichotomous logic: eligible versus 
non-eligible. It also has an impact on incentives 
because withdrawing aid from countries making 
progress does not help promote their national 
development efforts. 
Beyond these aspects, the fact that several donors 
apply the same graduation criterion (for example, 
recipient upgrade to the middle-income category) 
may lead to a simultaneous and uncoordinated 
withdrawal of resources, which could affect a 
country’s conditions for stability and progress. 
This is not a hypothetical case, as there are many 
donors (particularly multilateral) who base 
graduation criteria on per capita income, setting 
the threshold similar to that defined in the middle-
income category. Consequently, Salgado and Waltz 
(2013) estimate that between 2013 and 2030, 41 
countries will be graduated from IDA (the World 
Bank’s concessional window), 15 will graduate from 
the African Development Fund, 15 from the Asian 
Fund, and around 38 from the GAVI Alliance. The 
simultaneous graduation from many organizations 
will cause some MICs to lose between 25% and 40% 
of the international aid funds they received. This 
sudden withdrawal of funds, apart from severely 
limiting the aggregate volume of resources available 
for the country, can affect the composition of 
spending, as it has a more central impact on those 
components –such as education or health– for which 
aid funding is crucial. The costs of both processes 
could be considerable.  
Additionally, the simultaneous application of 
graduation processes can cause another undesirable 
effect, because it forces donors to concentrate 
their resources on an increasingly small number 
of countries, with a disproportional increase in the 
weight of aid in their respective public finances. 
Several studies confirm that aid is subject to 
diminishing returns, in such a way that its impact can 
become negative when its share of external resources 
reaches high levels. Dependence on aid constitutes 
a serious issue, one that could be intensified if the 
range of recipients is reduced (Glennie, 2008, Alonso 
et al., 2012). There are various reasons that explain 
this relation: the adverse effect of foreign resources 
on competitiveness (the “Dutch disease” effect), the 
recipient’s limited absorption capacity, the negative 
impact of resource availability on the tax system, the 
diversion of local human and technical resources that 
can be generated by aid administration or, ultimately, 
the negative effect on the quality of local institutions 
and their accountability to citizens. Regardless of 
how it happens, an increase in the aid dependency 
levels of some countries would be clearly negative.
In view of the costs associated with the graduation 
process, an improved system would replace 
graduation with gradualism; that is, aid should 
back up national efforts, modulating the intensity of 
support (and its contents) according to a recipient’s 
capacities and requirements. This involves paying 
more attention to poorer countries, but it does 
not excuse donors from granting aid to the most 
vulnerable MICs, while supporting their efforts and 
consolidating their achievements. Also, support 
should be maintained until the probabilities of 
development reversal are considered to have died 
out; and this should not be measured only via per 
capita GDP. At the same time, the aid withdrawal 
process should be gradual, keeping the affected 
country under observation, in order to avoid any 
reversals of their development achievements.
In sum, if donors want to set down eligibility and 
graduation criteria, the latter should be built, first, 
through a broad range of indicators that offer a rich 
perspective which is as comprehensive as possible, 
of a country’s conditions. Second, criteria should 
be selected carefully, in such a way that they do 
not include limitations that may be the result of a 
governments’ own actions (because in such event 
we would be rewarding irresponsible behaviors 
on the part of the beneficiary), and do not entail a 
penalization of development efforts (because here 
donors would be introducing perverse incentives 
into the system). Finally, a careful transition 
process should be outlined, by defining alternative 
cooperation mechanisms for countries eligible for 
graduation. During this transition period, donors 
should monitor countries to make sure that aid 
withdrawal does not entail serious costs to their 
development processes. An example of this careful 
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and watchful procedure is the one established for 
the graduation process of the Least Development 
Countries (LDCs)10. 
4.3. a note on the eu
The new EU development policy , based on 
the communication, Increasing impact of EU 
development policy: An agenda for change, aims 
to apply differentiated criteria (preferences in aid 
allocation and diverse instrumental offers for various 
country groups), incorporating a graduation process 
for  access to donations by a broad group of upper 
middle-income countries, including two lower 
middle-income countries. All of this is accompanied 
by a marked preference for redirecting funds towards 
low-income countries, LDCs and fragile states. 
The subject is of interest, as it refers to the treatment 
that should be given to MICs, and it affects a wide 
group of traditional Spanish cooperation partners 
in Latin America11. It is true that graduation in 
resorting to aid does not mean that these countries 
are excluded from access to other types of support 
mechanisms, through the thematic and regional 
programs of the Development Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI), and other types of instruments 
with a lower level of concessionality. However, the 
lack of defined priorities in such mechanisms makes 
that option seem like a meager consolation for 
excluded countries (Herbert, 2013 a /b).
The arguments that justify such decisions respond 
to the search for greater selectivity in international 
actions, a more precise identification of the added 
value offered by Community cooperation, and 
complementarity with development policies of 
partner countries. The pertinence of these objectives 
is hard to refute; the problem lies in whether the 
execution of the proposal is properly designed. In 
this regard, four critical points that should be noted:
•  First, the new proposal confers a prominent 
role to per capita GDP (and, to a smaller 
extent, to country size) as a criterion 
both for aid allocation and graduation of 
countries. We have already mentioned the 
severe limitations entailed by this criterion 
in guiding aid allocation decisions. The 
European Commission is aware of these 
limitations and suggests, in a somewhat 
imprecise manner, the possibility of 
considering additional criteria such as 
the Human Development Index (HDI), 
the economic vulnerability index, aid 
dependence, the country’s economic growth, 
or its capacity to attract foreign investment. 
But the truth is that these other criteria, 
which are very heterogeneous, are not 
accurately articulated in an appropriately 
built basis for decision-making. It is therefore 
not surprising that the European Parliament 
has submitted a more concrete proposal, 
suggesting a series of supplementary 
criteria to define exceptions in the country 
graduation process. Although not all 
proposed criteria are appropriate, the idea 
of drawing attention to the limitations of the 
excessive prominence of per capita GDP is 
entirely relevant12. 
• Second, the Commission opts for the 
(perhaps excessive) use of categories which 
incorporate countries of differing conditions. 
Of course, this critical judgment could be 
applied to the categories established on the 
basis of per capita GDP (low, lower middle 
and upper middle), but also to the LDCs or 
fragile states. The latter category is quite 
controversial, and contains a remarkable 
diversity of situations (Harttgen and Klasen, 
2012). The same could be said about the LDC 
group which, in spite of their denomination, 
comprises as much as 15 lower middle-
income countries, two upper middle-income 
countries and one high-income country (as 
well as all 31 low-income countries). The 
internal heterogeneity of these categories 
makes them a very deficient instrument 
10 The graduation process of a country as a LDC is prolonged in time through subsequent stages where monitoring is prepared and provided 
to the affected country. Specifically, after verifying that a country is eligible for graduation, three years are given to define the “impact 
assessment” of the decision and to prepare a “vulnerability profile” for the country; in year 3, such inputs are analyzed, as well as the report 
made by the country itself and, if applicable, the graduation proposal is forwarded to the CDP and ECOSOC and notified to the UN General 
Assembly; in years 3-6 the transition strategy is prepared and country follow-up is conducted by DESA; if everything is done correctly, 
in year 6 (or 3 years following the decision by the General Assembly), the decision is taken to graduate the country; and, finally, the 
application of the transition strategy is extended over subsequent years, as well as the monitoring of the country’s performance by means of 
triennial reports (see CDP, 2008).
11 Upper middle-income countries that graduate are: Argentina, Brazil, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Kazajstan, Iran, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Thailand, Venezuela, and Uruguay. The two lower middle-income countries eligible for 
graduation would be India and Indonesia.
12 It is suggested that a middle/high-income country might have access to donations if it meets the following criteria: i) being below 0.75 
in the HDI; b) having a poverty ratio above 10% (based on the 2-dollar poverty line); iii) being above 4% in the poverty gap index; and iv) 
having a Gini index over 45%. Just by way of example, both Ecuador and Colombia would fully meet these criteria. Indicators in Ecuador 
are: 0.725; 28.6; 4.02; 49.3; and in Colombia: 0.722; 37.2; 6.79 ; 55.9.
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to determine aid allocation or graduation 
criteria.
• Third, the design of the graduation process 
must be accompanied by a precise definition 
of alternative mechanisms to which graduate 
countries can resort. The idea is to make 
the graduation process easier, removing the 
uncertainty experienced by countries with the 
suppression of one of their funding sources. 
The Commission cites such alternative 
mechanisms, but there is no clarity as to the 
implications of access to said instruments by 
affected countries. That is, the graduation 
design, instead of reducing uncertainties 
for the affected countries, actually increases 
them.
• Last, as was previously pointed out, all 
graduation processes should be accompanied 
by a transition path, where donors monitor 
the impact of graduation on the affected 
country, in such a way that compensatory or 
provisional mechanisms can be established 
when required, or even the reversal of 
graduation in more serious cases. None of 
this was conceived by the Commission.
In sum, the EU set out a path of greater selectivity 
which cannot be criticized, but the implementation of 
this policy is grossly inadequate. 
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The previous analysis suggests that cooperation with MICs should 
be organized mainly around two major purposes: to help countries 
overcome the obstacles that restrict their development (tackling the 
middle-income traps), and to support their efforts to assume a more 
prominent role in international cooperative action. Table 7 (further 
developed in the Appendix) provides a synthetic view of the areas 
in which these purposes may be implemented, and the role that the 
international cooperation can play in them.
5. THE MIC AGENDA:
FACING MIDDLE INCOME TRAPS 
AND PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATIVE ACTION 
TABLE 7: AGENDA FOR COOPERATION WITH MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
Strengthen institutions and
improve social cohesion
Mobilize domestic resources 
and support   integration into 
international markets 
Promote technological capacities 
and support productive change
Support to regional
integration processes
Support for South-South 
Cooperation
Support for the provision of regional 
and global public goods
Policy coherence: new resources 
and new global governance
Support for 
international 
cooperative action
Help to overcome 
structural obstacles 
for development 
(Middle income 
traps)
Agenda for
Cooperation with MICs
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5.1. overcoMIng the MIddle-
IncoMe traps
Any attempt to identify the problems of MICs 
must begin with a note of caution about the vast 
heterogeneity that characterizes this group of 
countries. The generic “middle-income” term 
comprises a series of very diverse countries in terms 
of their size, achievements and potentials. As a 
result, supposedly unique and universal diagnoses 
or treatments are not what is needed; agendas must 
necessarily adapt to the circumstances of each case.
However, once this caution is noted, it is possible 
to identify certain areas in which, quite often, there 
are problems that seriously affect the chances for 
development of MICs: it is around these problem 
areas –institutional change and social cohesion, 
financial integration and macroeconomic stability, 
and productive, technological and energy patterns– 
where the middle-income traps emerge. The 
international literature, although very recent13, has 
tended to focus on the third of the traps considered 
here (productive change), but there are good 
reasons and a broad series of historical experiences 
which suggest that the other two (governance and 
financial traps) are major source of blockages in the 
development process of middle-income countries.
a)The Governance Trap
The first trap is associated with a country’s 
governance conditions. As countries progress, they 
require more complex institutions which are capable 
of dealing with the coordination issues inherent to 
more developed economies and, at the same time, to 
meet the needs of societies that are more demanding 
with the country’s governance situations. In other 
words, the development process also requires a path 
of institutional change. Both processes do not always 
move at the same pace, and frequently, advances in 
economic and social areas are not accompanied by 
a parallel renovation of the institutional framework, 
creating a problem that may affect the sustainability 
of the development process. This situation 
particularly affects MICs, as they are nations which 
undergo the most accelerated transformations. 
This is not a merely technical matter. Frequently, the 
problem lies not only in the weakness and limited 
efficiency of institutions, but also in their reduced 
credibility, causing citizens not to regard them as an 
appropriate channel for managing collective issues. 
This situation is fueled by the extraordinary levels 
of inequality and the social/regional fragmentation 
typical of some MICs. Such acute inequality and lack 
of social cohesion, firmly rooted over time, becomes 
a corrosive element for institutional legitimacy. 
This factor is particularly serious in countries with 
high horizontal inequalities (inequality among 
groups), within an environment of very limited social 
mobility. 
In these cases it is hard to build institutions that are 
both solid and socially rooted. As a consequence, 
countries are less capable of providing the public 
goods demanded by society; to deal with the 
distributive tensions derived from development 
processes; to face the external shocks that may 
affect the economy; or to carry out coordination and 
market development tasks inherent to the State. In 
other words, institutional weakness damages the 
governance of development processes, making it 
difficult to sustain the process of growth and social 
change.
Institutional weakness is also reflected in the fragile 
nature of the fiscal contract on which the State is 
supported. If citizens question the legitimacy of 
public institutions, they are not likely to be motivated 
to pay taxes to finance them. Consequently, tax effort 
is low, tax evasion levels are high, and the financial 
difficulties faced by the State are recurring. This 
generates a vicious circle which is very difficult to 
escape: since public financial capacities are low, 
governments find it difficult to offer the public 
goods demanded by society, thus weakening 
their legitimacy; at the same time, such limited 
institutional legitimacy causes citizens not to feel 
committed to supporting the State with their taxes 
(Alonso, 2010, Alonso et al. 2011).
In this context, strengthening the institutional 
framework and improving social cohesion should be 
one of the key focuses of international cooperation. 
The aim should be not only to improve institution 
efficiency, but also their capacity to articulate 
collective action, which is necessarily related 
to institutional credibility and legitimacy. The 
improvement of transparency and accountability 
is a part of these aspects, as is the fight against 
corruption and the strengthening of the rule of law.
As pointed out before, consolidating institutions is 
difficult unless social inequalities are corrected and 
social and regional cohesion are promoted at the 
same time. International cooperation can play a role 
in this task. Many MICs are trying to consolidate 
their public education, health and social protection 
13 The term “middle-income trap” was first used by Gill, Kharas et al. (2007) and subsequently reflected in the Growth Report by the 
Commission on Growth and Development (2008) and Spence (2011). It was simultaneously used by Alonso (2007) under a different name 
(“progress traps”)
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systems. The quality and universal accessibility 
of these services, at least on a basic level, is an 
important factor in favoring social inclusion and 
combating inequality. International cooperation can 
support these efforts through various instruments 
(budgetary support, sectoral approaches or projects), 
based on each country’s circumstances. This action is 
compatible with more focused interventions geared 
towards correcting exclusion in the most vulnerable 
sectors (as done, for example, by conditional transfer 
programs). Equally, international cooperation can 
play an active role in correcting gender inequalities, 
by supporting public equality policies and increasing 
their effectiveness. Donor experience in this field may 
be relevant.
A key sector for the promotion of social mobility 
and equity is education. In MICs, the levels of access 
to primary education are relatively high; however, 
the quality of this service is low and, above all, the 
coverage and quality of secondary education is 
deficient. In fact, it is often at this educational level 
where one finds the mechanisms that cause social 
segmentation, restricting the role of education 
as a promoter of social mobility. International 
cooperation can actively work in this area, supporting 
efforts made by governments to reinforce the quality 
and accessibility of secondary education in MICs. 
Apart from social fragmentation, some MICs are 
characterized by the presence of a clear lack of 
regional cohesion. International cooperation should 
consider this aspect when deciding on which regional 
context it should focus its efforts. At the same time, 
available evidence suggests international cooperation 
should actively support those public policies which 
aim to correct imbalances in income distribution 
between regions.
A compulsory aspect part of this issue is to build 
a more demanding claimant between the citizens 
and the State, which consists in the design and 
application of a more demanding fiscal contract, 
providing the State with resources to finance public 
policies and, at the same time, evidencing the 
willingness to distribute the tax burden according to 
the taxpayers’ ability to pay. In this area international 
cooperation can also play a significant but minor role 
by providing technical assistance and the exchange 
of experiences for the design of the tax system and in 
the improvement of the tax administration.  
Finally, this improvement of institutions should go 
hand in hand with another parallel objective, aimed 
at strengthening local civil society and its channels of 
pressure and expression to institutions, so that they 
can have an impact on the public agenda, and claim 
the transparency and accountability they are entitled 
to. In view of the levels of social fragmentation and 
distrust of institutions, this active role of civil society 
is absolutely crucial in stimulating a process of 
change within these countries.
b)The Financial Trap
The second problem area for the development 
of MICs derives from the sometimes difficult 
compatibility between the increasing integration 
of these countries into the international financial 
markets and the possibility to preserve the conditions 
of macroeconomic stability required for sustainable 
growth. These countries are typically characterized by 
their tendency to become indebted in international 
financial markets. However, within an environment 
of capital account deregulation, these markets tend 
to accentuate the cyclical behavior of economies, 
giving rise to recurring episodes of macroeconomic 
instability, with serious costs both in social terms 
and in the economies’ capacity for growth. With 
high debt-to-GDP ratios, securities denominated 
in foreign currency (and, sometimes, in limited-
term bonds), and a reduced fiscal space to maintain 
counter-cyclical policies, these countries are subject 
to the influence of the animal spirit of international 
investors. In cases of greater tension, such instability 
episodes result in severe financial crises, associated 
with the over-accumulation of debt, bankruptcy of 
national banking systems, or unsustainable exchange 
rates (Ocampo, 2003, 2011 and Ocampo & Griffith-
Jones, 2007). 
However, the severity of this financial trap seems 
to be lower today than in the past. As a result of 
the expansive tone of the previous economic cycle, 
capital markets provided funding under acceptable 
terms to several MICs. Additionally, current 
account surpluses, in many cases stimulated by 
the commodities boom, allowed these countries to 
increase their official reserves and international 
assets in an unprecedented manner. In fact, the 
emerging market economies have come to hold 
nearly two thirds of global official reserves. This 
financial asset accumulation (a sort of self-insurance 
against international financial risks) has provided 
many of these countries with greater room for 
maneuver amidst changing market conditions.  
In any case, in order to reduce the risk of falling 
into a financial trap, progress should be made 
in these countries in at least three areas. First, 
03
032 / Cooperation with Middle-Income Countries
Nº
SPANISH COOPERATION WORKING PAPERS 2014
_Facing Middle-Income Traps and Promoting International Cooperative Action 
domestic resources should be mobilized, promoting 
national savings to avoid excessive dependence on 
international funding, which intensifies the risks of 
contagion in the event of a crisis. For this purpose, 
it is necessary to preserve macroeconomic balances, 
enhance the national banking system and promote 
the development of financial markets. 
Second, the margin for the design of counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies must be expanded. This 
involves strengthening the State’s fiscal capacity 
and setting rules to preserve stability throughout 
the cycle, combining surplus periods, in peak times, 
with public deficit periods, when required. Resorting 
to Stabilization Funds which accumulate part of 
the trade surpluses obtained during peak times in 
export product prices is another resource along the 
same line. It is not easy to promote counter-cyclical 
policies within an environment of full deregulation of 
capital movements. Instead, international experience 
reveals that the space to design this type of policies 
is expanded when some capital account regulation is 
applied.
Last, progress is also required in the correction of 
existing asymmetries within international financial 
markets. The efforts launched by the G-20 for 
this purpose as a result of the crisis are manifestly 
incomplete. In this respect, it seems necessary to 
continue making progress in the design of solutions 
to prevent the presence of spaces which are opaque 
to regulation and monitoring, and to modify the 
pro-cyclical tone typical of capital markets. Although 
the IMF capital expansions are on the right path, 
there is a need for a mechanism that operates as 
an international liquidity provider, in the required 
amount and with the required agility during crisis 
episodes, in order to prevent the triggering of 
contagion mechanisms. Ultimately, the international 
monetary system should be reviewed, with the aim 
of avoiding the asymmetries caused by the current 
situation, which intensify the recessionary tone 
of adjustments and promote the accumulation of 
imbalances between countries.
Development cooperation plays a limited role in 
solving these issues. Most of them depend on the 
action taken by national governments, leaving to 
international cooperation the role of supplying 
technical assistance and exchange of experiences 
where required. Some donors have greater capacity 
for action in the field of international financial 
regulation; not in vain many of them are part of 
the G-20 and a relevant part of the more directly 
involved institutions (the IMF, the Bank for 
International Settlements, etc.). In these cases, 
the responsibility will not lie with the cooperation 
systems but rather with the action of governments, 
particularly those of developed countries (through 
finance ministries or other line ministries). This 
reveals the importance for MICs of setting global 
development agendas (not just ODA) and the 
improvement of policy coherence levels.
c)The Productivity Change Trap
A third group of problems is linked to the difficulties 
suffered by MICs to maintain a productive and 
technological transformation process as they move 
forward in their development process. Traditionally, 
productive specialization of these countries has been 
based on natural-resource intensive sectors and 
unskilled labor. As they advance in their development 
process, salary costs rise and the economies must 
move towards more dynamic specializations, which 
entails applying greater technological capacities and 
more qualified human resources. These resources 
are not always available to countries, and they see 
themselves caught in one specialization that prevents 
them from making their productivity grow at the 
right pace, thus hindering the sustainability of their 
convergence process.
Reaching this goal would require a combined 
effort: investing in physical and human capital, 
promoting technological capacities, going from a 
copy/adaptation model to an innovation model, 
creating efficient infrastructures and enhancing a 
climate of fair competition in the markets. All of this 
should be accompanied by a careful combination of 
selective and temporary policies for the protection 
of those sectors considered key, with active support 
and export promotion measures. Strengthening 
such a complex process within a context of financial 
restrictions and weak institutions, is not an easy 
task. The WTO has not made this task any easier by 
reducing –but not eliminating– the space for the 
design of industrial policies in developing countries. 
The requirements of environmental sustainability 
have added new demands to the productive 
transformation process of MICs. These countries 
are forced to review their energy model and their 
technological-productive patterns, if they want their 
rate of growth (sometimes intense) not to result in 
costly environmental damages. Countries do not 
always have access to the technological options 
needed to advance in these changes in energy and 
production patterns. 
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Given their abundance of natural resources, 
some MICs have reinforced their specialization 
in commodities. In an environment of increasing 
international competitiveness, it is reasonable for 
countries with such abundance of resources to make 
use of their advantage in the international market. 
But we should not forget that development requires 
a process of increasingly complex and diversified 
specialization, encouraging productive change and 
the promotion of technological capacities. 
In this area, the role of development cooperation 
is limited, but not irrelevant. Particularly if we 
consider development cooperation beyond what is 
strictly reported as ODA. There are six areas where 
cooperation may be deployed. Specifically: 
• First, it can operate by supporting innovative 
enterprises, by using financial instruments 
to create seed capital or venture capital 
corporations capable of promoting and 
consolidating successful companies. The 
experience of the OECD and of some 
developing countries reveals that public 
policies can boost the offer of these 
financing mechanisms linked to innovative 
enterprises. To a similar extent, it can 
develop and back up business support and 
training in innovative areas, so as to promote 
the productive change. Development 
cooperation can support these policies both 
through financial instruments and technical 
assistance.
• Second, it is essential to enhance these 
countries’ technological capabilities, and 
their creation of innovations and access 
to productive knowledge. In this area 
country experiences are very diverse, 
including the launch of business incubators, 
business training actions, programs to 
support institutional mechanisms for the 
enhancement of technological transfers 
(university and corporate spin-off), and 
eventually any international cooperation 
programs in the field of research, innovation 
and knowledge networks. In all of these 
areas, cooperation can act as a mechanism of 
support and assistance to national policies.
• Third, cooperation can also help to encourage 
change in the energy patterns of countries, 
by supporting renewable and non-carbon-
emitting sources so that they have a 
higher share of overall supply. Similarly, 
cooperation can help to encourage changes 
in the more pollutant technological options, 
benefitting other productive sources which 
generate less harmful emissions. These 
processes can form part of sustainable 
development strategies, to which donors can 
contribute with their own experiences. 
• Fourth, there will not be any productive 
change unless countries promote the 
improvement of infrastructure, both physical 
and technological. Development cooperation 
cannot assume this task on its own, but it 
can play a catalytic role in the mobilization 
of international resources which make 
funding programs (not entirely reportable 
as ODA) feasible, allowing for a process of 
improvement and expansion of infrastructure 
in this type of countries.
• Fifth, productive change requires 
skilled manpower, emanating both from 
professional training and from university 
education. Governments are responsible 
for defining education programs, but 
international development cooperation can 
support these policies not only with financial 
resources, but also with technical assistance 
or university exchange programs. What is 
crucial in this type of countries is to seek a 
specific balance in the support to education 
cycles, paying more attention –unlike in 
poorer countries– to secondary, professional 
and university education.
• Finally, it is also important to operate on 
the regulatory framework of countries, so 
as to encourage dynamism in their business 
demography, removing any unnecessary 
bureaucratic constraints for the creation of 
new companies, and setting incentives (tax 
and credit) for those entrepreneurs operating 
in innovative fields, which, by definition, 
entail higher risks. Here again, development 
cooperation has a potential role to fulfill by 
providing technical assistance.
5.2. proMotIng global
cooperatIve actIon
The second purpose of international cooperation 
with MICs is to support and enhance the role of these 
countries play on the international scene, so that 
they can take on increasing responsibility in overall 
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governance. This purpose is unfolded in four prefe-
rential areas: supporting South-South cooperation, 
supporting regional integration processes, promoting 
involvement in the provision of regional and glo-
bal public goods, promoting policy coherence and 
supporting improvements in the representation and 
voice of these countries in international fora.
a)Supporting South-South Cooperation
Support to South-South cooperation is a mandatory 
part in the cooperation agenda with MICs. Through 
this channel, the restrictive and dualistic view 
(donors versus recipients) of the cooperation system 
that dominated in the past is being reconsidered, 
reflecting the fact that the correction of inequalities 
is a shared task which all countries are summoned to 
assume, according to their capacities. 
The exact volume of South-South cooperation is not 
entirely known: deficient records and accountability 
systems hinder the task of defining a more precise 
figure, but the estimates made by the DAC in relation 
to 25 donors is 10 billion dollars (around 8% of 
overall ODA) in 2010, with Saudi Arabia (3 billion), 
China (2 billion) and Turkey (1 billion) as the most 
important providers. Such estimates do not include 
all new donors from the South; therefore aggregate 
figures must be higher than those presented here. 
Anyway, this is an increasing phenomenon, so in 
2025 South-South cooperation is expected to reach a 
volume of 50 billion dollars. This suggests a growing 
trend, contrary to the trend evidenced by traditional 
donors in recent years.
In any case, the term “South-South cooperation” 
comprises very different cooperation models and 
practices, some of which deserve justified criticism 
(Alonso 2013, Kragelund, 2008, Zimmermann and 
Smith, 2011, among others). In spite of this diversity, 
South-South cooperation incorporates new elements 
of interest for the international development 
cooperation system, beyond the resources it 
mobilizes. First, it is based on a more horizontal 
relationship, it has greater potential to promote the 
ownership of initiatives by those involved, generating 
“double dividend” activities, where both countries 
boost their institutional and technical capabilities. 
Second, South-South cooperation enables developing 
countries to learn from the experience of other 
similar countries, sharing initiatives that are much 
closer and whose startup is cheaper than the
technical assistance supplied by developed countries. 
Third, South-South cooperation tends to broaden the 
range of existing cooperation models and cultures, 
creating a healthy competition climate for traditional 
donors. Fourth, the emergence of new donors 
expands the range of options for recipient countries, 
which helps them increase their room for strategic 
maneuver in the international scene (Kragelund 
2008, Zimmermannn and Smith, 2011). Finally, 
South-South cooperation contributes to disseminate 
a sense of common responsibility in tasks associated 
with the correction of international inequalities. 
Based on all these attributes, it would be reasonable 
for traditional donors to support the efforts of some 
MICs to provide an efficient and technically solid 
South-South cooperation system, by supporting 
the institutions in charge of this policy. Through 
triangular cooperation, traditional donors 
can get involved by more actively supporting 
South-South cooperation, increasing available 
resources or facilitating projects that would not 
be feasible otherwise. Similarly, donors may 
back up cooperation initiatives within a regional 
scope between developing countries, providing 
mechanisms of monitoring, evaluation and mutual 
learning at that level. Finally, the stronger presence 
of non-DAC donors in the cooperation system 
should entail a review of the system’s governance 
structure, opting for those which are more inclusive 
and representative. Up to now, the two initiatives 
arising in this respect, the Development Cooperation 
Forum of ECOSOC, and the Global Partnership 
on Aid Effectiveness, arising from the post-Busan 
dynamics, are still imperfect attempts to reform the 
system’s governance, but they both signal this task is 
opportune.
b)Support to Regional Integration Processes 
Since the origin of development theory, regional 
integration was considered to be a good way to 
overcome some of the issues arising in development 
processes. Through integration, mutual institutional 
capacities are enhanced, the market available 
to encourage industrialization is expanded, 
exchange between countries is promoted, and 
overall bargaining position of affected countries in 
the international system is improved. The views 
that inspired integration processes in the past, 
understanding the regional market as a space to 
encourage industrialization, has been replaced 
in recent times with a more open conception of 
regionalism, which emphasizes the role of the 
regional environment as a platform –for competitive 
and institutional strengthening– from which to 
encourage the external expansion of member 
economies.
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In spite of its potential and the multiple initiatives 
launched, the truth is that a large part of regional 
integration experiences between Southern countries 
have not met the expectations with which they were 
initially created. The degree of success varies with 
each case, but very few integration schemes have 
followed a pattern of continuing progress. The causes 
of these meager results include the dependence 
on extra-regional economies (basically from the 
developed world), limited economic complementarity 
of partner countries, resistance to surrendering 
sovereignty that is entailed in any integration 
process, the limited effort made to create solid 
institutions linked to the integration process, or the 
limited reputation advantage derived from regional 
association. Despite this, regional integration is an 
option to be contemplated as a desirable alternative 
for a broad group of developing countries, regardless 
of whether those countries or the region altogether 
take part in other bi-regional or multilateral 
agreements.
Middle-income countries are expected to be 
prominent in regional integration schemes. This 
role results from the size and, in some cases, from 
the dynamism of countries, which generate major 
externalities over their regional environment. Some 
donors have found in such effects a reason to support 
their cooperation with certain MICs (sometimes 
referred to as “anchor countries”) (BMZ, 2011). 
By supporting a successful trajectory of progress 
in those countries acting as regional poles, donors 
may create the basis to open new development 
opportunities for the entire region. As Cohen (2006: 
91) points out: “There is no better predictor of a 
country’s economic growth than the growth rate of 
its closest neighbors”. International development 
cooperation may take advantage of this role held by 
MICs to support regional integration processes. 
Work in this field can be carried out in three 
major areas. First, by enhancing human and 
technical capabilities of the institutions in charge 
of integration; second, by promoting experiences 
of inter-government policy coordination within 
the region, in order to build a culture of trust and 
shared work among partners, even in areas not 
inherent to the integration process. Finally, of great 
interest are those initiatives aimed at improving 
the connection between countries, through 
investment on infrastructures, not only physical, 
aimed at promoting exchange and communication 
between partners, intensifying their relations and 
interdependences.
c)Provision of Regional and
Global Public Goods
As was previously pointed out, one of the tasks for 
international cooperation is to improve the levels 
of provision of regional and global public goods 
with an impact in terms of development. At the 
same time, we have seen that MICs have, due to 
their weight and dynamism, a relevant role in the 
provision of these goods at a global scale, and they 
are among the countries most affected in the event 
of their inadequate provision. For example, MICs 
are responsible for 54% of CO2, emissions, with 
a growing trend in their share. Clearly, setting an 
agreement framework to limit emissions will not 
be an easy task without the effective consensus and 
involvement of these countries. Something similar 
occurs in relation to biodiversity, since 65% of global 
forest areas are located in middle-income countries: 
without their collaboration it will be difficult to 
preserve this world heritage.
Nonetheless, the provision of public goods entails 
some costs. A country with severely restricted 
resources (a developing country) is not likely 
to assume these costs on its own, knowing that 
the benefits of such action would be shared with 
countries with much higher incomes. The result will 
be a trend toward opportunistic behavior (free-rider). 
In order to correct this trend, the international 
community must create incentive mechanisms and 
support MICs to offset part of the costs which they 
incur, encouraging them to adopt a more committed 
role in the management of common issues.  
Although a broad group of MICs are key in the 
provision of international public goods (IPGs), there 
are many countries within this group that would also 
be severely affected by the under-provision of such 
goods. The best example can be found in climate 
change: if the lack of an international solution 
is prolonged over time, a vast group of middle-
income countries would be seriously affected by the 
consequences of the increasing temperatures (among 
them, several Pacific island and many countries 
in Central America and the Caribbean). Both the 
economic vulnerability index and the natural 
disasters risk index clearly evidence this reality. 
Specifically, from the 15 countries most exposed 
to natural disaster risks, 11 are middle-income 
countries; and from the 15 with the highest level of 
aggregate risk 14 , 13 are middle-income countries 
(Table 8).
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This problem not only occurs in connection with 
environmental issues. Middle-income countries are 
among those most harmed by the lack of efficient 
mechanisms to provide international financial 
stability, as these countries are most exposed to the 
instability risks implied in these markets; middle-
income countries may also be negatively affected by 
an inappropriate regulation of intellectual property 
rights, as these countries have the greatest demand 
of technology resources; ultimately, it is MICs which 
may be most affected by the inappropriate regulation 
of international migration, since they are the top 
contributors to migratory flows.
The prominence of MICs can be even greater in 
the provision of regional or sub-regional public 
goods: in these cases, the provision of goods will 
essentially depend on the countries involved, which 
in many regions are all developing countries. Some 
examples include the management of a river basin, 
the treatment of a “common good” (such as a forest 
area), the generation of instances for macroeconomic 
coordination, the outline of shared mechanisms for 
exchange risk attenuation or the setting of networks 
and infrastructures for the correct use of an energy 
resource. In all cases we refer to regional public 
goods, which shall be provided only if those countries 
involved agree to it, economically contribute to it, 
and establish the necessary institutions to make such 
provision possible.
International development cooperation may 
exert a relevant role in these areas, by supporting 
agreements and contributing with financial and 
technical resources to make them possible. It 
may also support the institutions required for the 
management of some of these goods.
d) Changing the rules and structures of global 
governance: toward policy coherence
One last area in which to roll out the policy of 
development cooperation with MICs is that 
associated with the effect of other policies –beyond 
aid– on these countries’ chances for progress. For 
many middle-income countries, as was previously 
stated, the importance of aid is relatively minor; 
these are countries that are much more integrated 
in the international markets than poorer countries. 
EXPOSURE TO NATURAL DISASTERS INDEX OF RISK OF NATURAL DISASTERS
COUNTRY GROUP INDEX COUNTRY GROUP INDEX
Vanuatu MIC 63.66 Vanuatu MIC 36.31
Tonga MIC 53.27 Tonga MIC 28.62
Philippines MIC 52.46 Philippines MIC 27.98
Japan HIC 45.91 Guatemala MIC 20.75
Costa Rica MIC 42.61 Bangladesh LIC 20.22
Brunei HIC 41.1 Solomon Is. MIC 18.15
Mauritius MIC 37.35 Costa Rica MIC 17.38
Guatemala MIC 36.3 Camboya LIC 17.17
El Salvador MIC 32.6 East Timor MIC 17.13
Bangladesh LIC 31.7 El Salvador MIC 16.89
Chile MIC 30.95 Brunei HIC 15.92
Holland HIC 30.57 Papua New Guinea MIC 15.81
Solomon Is. MIC 29.98 Mauritius MIC 15.39
Fiji MIC 27.71 Nicaragua MIC 15.36
Cambodia LIC 27.65 Fiji MIC 13.69
TABLE 8: 15 COUNTRIES WITH GREATEST EXPOSURE AND RISK OF NATURAL DISASTERS
Source: World Risk Report, 2012  
14 Aggregate risk results from considering four aspects: exposure to risk, susceptibility of being affected, capacities to deal with risks, and 
adaptive possibilities.
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Thus, the orientation of donor policies is crucial, 
due to their great influence on the development 
possibilities of countries. This is why one of the 
mandatory aspects of the policy of cooperation 
with MICs is the improvement of policy coherence 
levels. Nevertheless, in an increasingly global world, 
policy coherence is not a goal that may be defined 
at a merely national scale: it should also affect the 
regulatory frameworks within which international 
relations are managed. 
These rules are particularly relevant for MICs, since 
they are still fragile economies, yet increasingly 
more exposed to the conditions of the international 
system. The existing rules with regard to trade, 
intellectual property rights and the regulation of 
foreign investment can be quite relevant for the 
development possibilities of these countries. In such 
cases the international environment should ensure 
the desired balance between preserving sufficient 
policy space for national strategies and, at the same 
time, provide global rules that are fair and efficient 
in order to regulate common issues. Some of the 
benefits that middle-income countries may obtain 
from international cooperation are derived from the 
modification of global rules that govern international 
transactions.
Together with the change in rules, it is also essential 
to adapt the governance instances of the international 
system in order to allow MICs, particularly the larger 
ones, to take part in the decision-making process at 
a global scale. Many of the existing institutions are, 
with slight modifications, those created in the 1950s, 
but the current world is so much different than the 
one which existed seven decades ago. It is important 
to make progress in the reform process, not only 
of informal inter-governmental instances –like the 
transit of G-7 to G-20–, but also of more central 
multilateral organizations in the global governance 
(such as the IMF, the Security Council, or the Bank 
for International Settlements, among others). In 
these cases the role of development cooperation is 
limited, but there is room for political dialogue and 
for the creation of alliances within the international 
instances to which donor countries belong.
5.3. suMMary: a systeM to 
MaxIMIze developMent 
IncentIves
The agenda proposed for MICs is intended to be 
consistent with the need to turn development 
cooperation into a system that maximizes 
development incentives. To this end, work must be 
deployed along four complementary lines of action: 
i) supporting countries to overcome deficiencies 
and structural bottlenecks in their development 
processes (promote national improvements); ii) 
ensuring the achievements attained given potential 
risks of reversal (avoid reversals); iii) maximizing 
the indirect benefits obtained by some countries as 
a result of the progress of other countries (benefit 
from positive externalities); and iv) building a 
cooperative action to deal with common problems 
(promote cooperative effort). In all of these aspects 
the development cooperation has an important role 
to fulfill in middle-income countries (Table 9): the 
described agenda integrates these aspects to a large 
extent within a coherent framework.
General Goal Specific Goals Cooperation with Middle-Income Countries
Incentive system to maximize 
development efforts
Promote Improvements Overcoming structural deficiencies (middle-
income traps)
Avoid Reversals Fighting poverty (and help correct inequality) 
Reducing risks and vulnerability
Changing the rules and structures of global
governance
Benefit from  Externalities Support dynamic regional poles of growth and 
favor integration
Promote Cooperative Effort at 
a global scale
Provide regional and global public goods
Support South-South Cooperation
TABLE 9: TASKS OF AN INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM
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6.1. the InstruMents
As often occurs when defining an agenda, the 
most appropriate implementation of aid is highly 
dependent on the specific traits of a given MIC. It 
is very likely that in the case of the least developed 
countries within this group, the most suitable 
implementation is not so different from what 
is commonly used for LICs; and, conversely, in 
countries with higher development, instruments 
not necessarily reported as ODA will probably have 
a much broader space. The typical heterogeneity of 
the middle-income group justifies this diversity. In 
any case, there is a vast group of countries between 
the above-mentioned extremes, for which the 
implementation of development cooperation may 
acquire specific profiles. The following considerations 
are formulated with regard to this sub-group.
It is important to emphasize an idea mentioned 
before: development problems suffered by a great 
deal of MICs are not so much related with the 
provision of external resources, but with overcoming 
specific restrictions  related to their governance 
conditions, social cohesion, productive change and 
international integration in said countries. Based on 
this, there are three precautions worth noting.
First, cooperation with these countries should be, in 
most cases, highly selective and strategic. It is not 
about designing generic supports for every country, 
but rather about identifying for each case the location 
of bottlenecks, and the core problems which block 
the path of progress.  Cooperation planning should 
be adapted to the selective nature of aid, being more 
demanding and strategic in identifying priorities, 
and more flexible in adapting to the country’s 
change process. It should therefore be a much more 
dynamic, less heavy and comprehensive than the 
one advised, for instance, by the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers.
Second, it has been noted that middle-income 
countries are quite heterogeneous, as seen in the 
productive, social and regional sectors. This fact may 
suggest the adoption of sub-national perspectives 
at the time of designing cooperation actions. 
International aid can help through this perspective to 
compensate, although partially, the existing regional 
inequalities, going where deficiencies are greater.  
Last, in many cases –particularly in larger or more 
developed countries– aid will always be a minor 
part of the international funding they receive. For 
this reason, the most relevant role aid has there 
is to modify the incentive framework in which 
agents operate, and not the effects derived from the 
In previous sections it has been argued that, even when needing 
international support, the development agenda for middle-income 
countries is very different from that of poorer countries. Likewise, 
aid implementation in MICs has unique profiles which must be 
considered, and which affect the roles of various actors.
6. INSTRUMENTS AND ACTORS
OF COOPERATION WITH
MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
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direct funding of changes. Thus also suggests that, 
together with aid, other cooperation instruments not 
reportable as ODA can be extraordinarily relevant.
In sum, the planning of interventions in MICs should 
be highly specific. It requires a very demanding 
previous diagnostic effort and dialogue with the 
recipient country, the strategic ability to selectively 
determine actions, specialized technical capacity, and 
a broad (and fresh) view to identify the most suitable 
actors and instruments (sometimes, beyond those 
strictly reportable as ODA). 
This approach to aid determines the type of 
implementation required for each case. In this 
regard, and recognizing the difficulties entailed 
by any generalization, there are five aspects worth 
emphasizing in terms of aid implementation in MICs.
• First, in the aid system it is generally 
important for donors to give increasing 
relevance to programme-based approaches, 
as these allow recipients to anticipate 
the committed supports and grant more 
predictability to flows. Studies on aid 
effectiveness are remarkably conclusive 
in this regard: the variability of flows, the 
inability of recipients to predict them, is 
eventually detrimental to aid effectiveness. 
Therefore, following such program-based 
aid approaches seems to be a mandatory 
recommendation, regardless of the country in 
question.
• Second, as a general rule, those instruments 
which are either highly intensive in the 
channeling of financial resources (e.g.: 
budgetary support), or are highly intrusive 
to the recipient’s decision-making process 
(e.g.: sector-wide support) are less adapted 
to the conditions of cooperation with MICs. 
Nonetheless, these instruments can be 
relevant in some countries (particularly 
those with lower incomes within the group) 
and for some sectors (for example, support 
to secondary education). But, in general, 
these instruments are more appropriate 
for cooperation with LICs. In the case 
of middle-income ones, the inadequacy 
of these instruments is based on two 
additional factors. First, the weight of aid 
in the total public budget is low, so –with 
a few exceptions– there are no stimuli for 
governments to subject themselves to such 
demanding formulas as those required 
by these mechanisms (budgetary support 
or sector-wide approach) in order to 
receive resources. Second, governments 
have sufficient technical and institutional 
capacities of their own in order to claim 
greater autonomy in the design of their 
policies, with no need to subject them to 
donor scrutiny. In sum, more selective 
instruments than those commented above 
seem to be more appropriate for middle-
income countries.
• Third, in cooperation with MICs, technical 
cooperation plays a crucial role. A great deal 
of donor efforts is aimed at strengthening 
institutions, transferring capacities and 
improving the design and implementation 
of policies. The predominant way for 
channeling aid in these cases is through 
technical cooperation. However, this type 
of cooperation has raised much criticism, 
as it is often based on an aid offer that is 
induced and determined by the donor, with 
excessive weight of expatriate experts and 
without questioning the applicability of 
the knowledge and the experiences being 
transferred to the local context. This criticism 
is true, as it alludes to the typical deficiencies 
of technical cooperation (Alonso, 2001). 
Overcoming such constraints is particularly 
relevant in the case of MICs, where we 
can move more easily toward technical 
cooperation based on local competences and 
institutions, more focused on deploying the 
country’s own capacities than on the mere 
transplant of donor capacities. Their great 
number of highly competent professionals, 
the more reduced and precise nature of 
their requirements and the presence of 
other countries with similar issues and 
successful experiences within their regional 
environment make this task easier.
• Fourth, some cooperation action in MICs 
is applied in areas where ODA is not as 
important as other cooperation instruments 
that go beyond aid. Work in the fields 
of enterprise promotion, investment on 
infrastructures, support to innovation 
and technological capacities or business 
financing, requires instruments which are 
only partly reportable as ODA. This is the 
case, for example, with financial cooperation 
(loans, insurance and equity participations), 
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the promotion of public-private associations 
to combine resources and capacities, or 
horizontal agreements between research 
centers and universities, which do not 
necessarily entail the mobilization of 
resources reportable as ODA. In the case 
of middle-income countries it is possible to 
establish much more horizontal cooperation 
relationships, where actors on both sides 
are genuinely interested, and such interest 
is not derived from the funds mobilized by 
the donor. Managers of cooperation with 
MICs should pay special attention to the 
possibilities provided by those instruments.
• Finally, financial instruments are of special 
interest to support the private sector of 
developing countries. Donors have created 
specialized institutions, the Development 
Financial Institutions (DFI), to manage 
these instruments. Some of the resources 
channeled by these institutions are not 
reportable as ODA, but they can prove 
really useful as support mechanisms for 
enterprise and innovation initiatives in 
recipient countries, with an impact in terms 
of development. To achieve this result, 
the instrument must be flexible and with 
the ability to identify opportunities and 
assume risks. It is in MICs where this type 
of instruments can have greater potentiality. 
In the Spanish case, the design of this 
instrument is not entirely appropriate, as it 
presents inconveniences which affect both its 
operations and management structure, which 
can seriously restrict their effectiveness. If 
Spain seeks to deploy a more dynamic action 
in this field, their design and regulations 
should be reviewed. 
6.3. the actors
As in other cases, in cooperation with middle-income 
countries there is space for the participation of a 
broad variety of social actors: and all of them should 
be involved in the policy being designed. However, 
compared to the cooperation with poorer countries, 
middle-income ones present three traits worth 
emphasizing:
• First, as was previously pointed out, MICs 
are characterized by a deep social and 
regional fragmentation, expressed in the 
form of high levels of inequality. Under such 
conditions, public institutions are likely 
to be inefficient in the correction of social 
exclusion and marginalization, as they are 
run by the prevailing interests. For this 
reason it is essential to work with civil society 
organizations, to strengthen the demands 
for social cohesion and to exert pressure in 
order to improve the quality of institutions. 
The role played by NGOs in promoting 
such objectives through advocacy tasks is 
crucial. At the same time, NGOs may play 
a key role in the access to public decisions 
by the more marginal sectors and to launch 
targeted initiatives to reduce exclusion. Social 
policies in middle-income countries are still 
fragile and, although their coverage intends 
to be universal, they usually exclude certain 
sectors of society. NGOs should also operate 
within the gaps of said policies, in order to 
enhance their universality and prevent any 
exclusion they could produce. In this case, 
paraphrasing Collier and Dollar (2004), it 
would not be enough for cooperation to work 
with the government, as it may be necessary 
to work through the government, by 
involving it in activities considered desirable, 
and work around the government, supporting 
the social dynamics which exert pressure on 
the government so that the latter increases its 
commitment in the combat of exclusion and 
poverty. In these two latter tasks, NGOs may 
have a key role. 
• Second, cooperation with MICs requires a 
more active presence of actors not necessarily 
specializing in cooperation work. Such is the 
case of research centers, business incubators, 
universities, institutions linked to the private 
sector, or institutions specializing in services 
to companies. The multiplicity of actors 
should be much higher in this case, to a 
large degree because the role of traditional 
actors (public agencies and NGDOs) is 
much less relevant than in poorer countries. 
Relationships based on knowledge and 
trustwhich are needed to involve such actors 
(beyond traditional agents of the cooperation 
system) do not always exist in development 
interventions in middle-income countries. 
Nevertheless, it is those actors who own the 
specialized knowledge that MICs usually 
require, and this is why their involvement 
is so crucial. Cooperation managers should 
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bear this in mind, opening the focus of their 
work alliances to integrate this multiplicity of 
actors.
• Finally, although public development 
agencies also play a fundamental role in 
cooperation with middle-income countries, 
their function should not be to lead the 
interventions, but rather to enable the 
necessary alliances between actors in order 
to make such interventions effective. As 
stated in the previous item, cooperation 
with MICs should summon multiple 
specialized institutions which are not 
typically part of the cooperation system. 
The relationship between this type of actors 
from the donor and recipient countries is 
very likely to be established in a much more 
horizontal environment, of collaboration 
between equals, thus breaking the vertical 
logic of traditional cooperation. This 
trend is promoted because many of the 
major challenges of MICs (environment, 
unemployment, innovative enterprise, 
institutional strengthening, etc.) are 
problems which must also be addressed 
by developed countries. Therefore, there 
are better conditions to move from aid to 
cooperation (the latter understood by its 
literal sense of “common work”). From this 
perspective, the role of the official agency 
would not be to lead interventions, but 
rather to create the conditions so that actors 
become involved and lay down the networks 
of agreement and common work in order to 
make changes a reality. Thus, a development 
agency would act more as a mediator than 
as a provider of services. Its role would be 
to record the recipient’s needs, identify 
suitable actors to meet such needs, through 
a dialogue with all of them, creating the right 
conditions to establish a network of shared 
work and defining the incentives (including 
financial incentives) to make this coordinated 
action feasible. The competences required 
for this type of institution are very different 
from traditional ones a development agency 
has had in the past: its work focus consists 
of policy dialogue, relationships with actors 
and the definition of incentives, instead of 
funding or direct service provision.  
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In previous sections we have attempted to set out the 
reasons why donors should keep an active policy of 
cooperation with MICs; at the same time, we have 
discussed the specificities that this policy should 
have, both in terms of agenda and implementation. 
This section does not intend to repeat the arguments 
previously offered, but rather to summarize the main 
ideas expressed here:
• First, the international scene has changed 
rather dramatically over the last years. 
This forces us to rethink the design and 
contents of the development cooperation 
system we want for the future. A great deal 
of those changes are led by MICs which, in 
turn, comprise the bulk of the population 
(and poverty) of the developing world. This 
process is not likely to be modified in the 
immediate future. For that reason, it seems 
necessary for donors to review their position 
with regard to middle-income countries 
in order to address their deficiencies 
and involve them more actively in the 
management of collective issues.
• Second, given the limited resources available, 
international cooperation should adopt 
an incentive-based approach, to obtain 
maximum development impact in the 
international system. As well as performing 
its typical redistribution role, it must also 
consider aid’s ability to generate dynamic 
incentives for change in those countries 
in which it operates. This means that 
cooperation must encourage development 
efforts by all countries, prevent reversal 
risks, make use of the positive externalities 
which countries have on others, and promote 
international cooperative action. 
• Third, considering the two factors above, we 
can confirm the need to maintain cooperation 
with MICs, in order to create an incentive 
system compatible with development 
objectives. This entails reviewing the criteria 
for country eligibility and graduation, 
generating transition processes which remove 
the costs which the simultaneous withdrawal 
of aid can cause to affected countries. 
• Fourth, the agenda for cooperation with MICs 
should be based on two major purposes: to 
help countries overcome the middle-income 
traps (associated with governance and social 
fragmentation issues, financial integration 
of countries and productive change & 
technological processes), and to support 
their involvement in cooperative action at 
a global scale (enhancing their integration 
processes, their policies for cooperation with 
other Southern countries, their involvement 
in the provision of international public goods 
and their greater visibility in the definition of 
global rules and governance).
• Fifth, in the implementation of cooperation 
with middle-income countries, the more 
intrusive forms of aid have less relevance, 
being replaced by technical cooperation 
and by those instruments operating beyond 
aid, in the fields of funding, generation 
of alliances and establishing horizontal 
relationships between countries.
• Sixth, multiple actors, many of whom are 
specialists not typically involved in the 
aid system, are summoned to work in the 
cooperation with MICs. Such diversity of 
actors implies searching for less vertical and 
hierarchical work relations, to the benefit 
of more horizontal, network relations; at 
the same time, the official development 
agency should move from being a provider of 
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services and funding to become a mediator, 
capable of identifying actors, building 
alliances and generating the incentives 
required for common work.
• Finally, cooperation with MICs, understood 
as suggested in these pages, to a certain 
extent anticipates what tomorrow’s 
cooperation should be like, as envisioned 
in the Busan agreement. That is, a more 
complex cooperation, capable of attracting 
multiple actors, including instruments 
beyond aid, establishing more horizontal 
and cooperative work relationships, and 
working on the basis of an agenda which 
includes the fight against extreme poverty, 
but also integrates other aspects inherent to 
development. For this reason, to a certain 
extent, cooperation with middle-income 
countries is a good laboratory for what 
could become the future of development 
cooperation for the world that emerges after 
the crisis. 
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APPENDIX: 
MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES:
AREAS OF WORK, STRATEGIC FIELDS, 
ROLE OF  COOPERATION AND MAIN 
INSTRUMENTS
MIDDLE 
INCOME 
TRAP
PROBLEMS STRATEGIC AREAS POTENTIAL 
INFLUENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION
MOST 
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Exclusion 
and Social 
fragmentation  
(inequality)
Support to social policies with basic 
universal standards in education, 
health and social protection.
High BS; SS; P&P; TA; 
RC; PD
Support to active policies for the 
inclusion of marginalized groups
High P&P; TA; PD
Support to education (mainly 
secondary and vocational) as a 
mechanism of social mobility
High SS; P&P; RC; PD
Support to policies of regional 
rebalancing and decentralization
Medium P&P; TA; RC; PD
Support to policies of gender 
equality promotion 
High P&P; TA; PD
Institutional
Support to technical capacities of 
institutions for the design of public 
policies
Medium TA; PD
Support to the creation of a body of 
civil servants (public administration)
Medium P&P; TA; PD
Support to Governments’ 
transparency and accountability
Medium P&P; TA
Note: The list of most relevant instruments is purely indicative: in each case, an analysis of the precise conditions of the intervention is required. The acronyms 
used correspond to the following instruments: BS: budgetary support; SS: broad sector strategies; P&P: projects and programs; TA: technical assistance; RC: 
reimbursable cooperation; PD: political dialogue. Finally, it is assumed that advocacy or development service provision work carried out by NGOs  are to be 
implemented preferably through projects and programs. 
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MIDDLE 
INCOME 
TRAP
PROBLEMS STRATEGIC AREAS POTENTIAL 
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Institutional
Support to mechanisms for dialogue 
and social consensus.
Medium P&P; TA
Support to the fight against 
corruption
Low P&P; TA; PD
Fragile fiscal 
contract
Support for the design of a capable, 
efficient and equitable tax system 
Medium P&P; TA; PD
Support to  tax authorities (including 
Customs)
Medium P&P; TA
Support to measures against tax 
avoidance and evasion
Low P&P; TA; PD
Advances in international tax 
cooperation 
Low PD
Fight against illicit financial flows Low TA; PD
Excessive need 
for financing in 
foreign currency
Support to policies for the promotion 
of domestic savings
Low TA; PD
Support to non-recessive 
macroeconomic stability
Low TA; PD
Support to local financial systems Low TA; RC; PD
Financial regulation on a global scale Low PD
Limited fiscal 
space
Regulation of capital accounts Low TA; PD
Financial cooperation on a regional 
scale 
Low TA; RC; PD
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MIDDLE 
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PROBLEMS STRATEGIC AREAS POTENTIAL 
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INTERNATIONAL 
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MOST 
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Dificultades para 
transitar desde la 
copia y adaptación 
tecnológica a la 
innovación
Cooperación en el ámbito científico y 
tecnológico
Medium PyP; AT; DP
Apoyo a los servicios de promoción 
de empresas innovadoras 
(incubadoras de empresas 
innovadoras, spin-offs corporativas y 
universitarias)
Medium PyP; AT
Apoyo a la capacitación empresarial Medium PyP; AT
Difficulties in 
movinh from 
technological 
copy/ adaptation  
to innovation
Cooperation in science and 
technology 
Medium P&P; TA; PD
Support promotion of innovative 
companies (innovative company 
incubators, corporate and university 
spin-offs)
Medium P&P; TA
Support to business training Medium P&P; TA
Difficulties 
in production 
diversification 
and moving 
toward sectors 
with higher added 
value
Support to financing entrepreneurial 
initiatives (seed capital and venture 
risk) 
High TA; RC
Support to improvements in 
the regulatory framework to 
promote the dynamics of business 
demography
Medium TA; PD
Difficulties 
to impose 
environmentally 
sustainable 
energetic and 
technological 
patterns
Support to the implementation 
of renewable and less pollutant 
sources of energy
Low TA; RC
Support to  the design of sustainable 
development strategies
Medium TA; PD
Limited or 
inefficient 
integration of 
existing human 
capital 
Support to high-quality secondary 
education 
High BS; SS; P&P; 
TA; PD
Support to professional and 
vocational training
High BS; SS; P&P; 
TA; PD
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Technical and 
institutional 
weakness of new 
donors
Technical and institutional 
enhancement of organizations in 
charge of South-South cooperation 
policies
High P&P; TA; PD
Limitation in levels 
of priority and 
resources for this 
policy
Support to triangular cooperation High P&P; TA; RC
Inappropriate 
international 
framework 
in  cooperation 
system 
governance
Review rules and structures of 
development cooperation system 
governance
High PD
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Limited 
institutional 
structure for 
the  integration 
process
Support to institutional instances for 
the regional integration process 
Medium P&P; TA; PD
Limited entity for 
regional-scope 
policies
Support to regional policies High SS; P&P; TA; 
RC; PD
Limited 
experience of 
interaction and 
shared work 
culture
Support to inter-government 
processes of work and investment 
in infrastructures for regional 
connectivity
Medium P&P; TA; RC; PD
Support to investments in 
infrastructures for regional 
connectivity
Medium P&P; RC; PD
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t t
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e 
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ov
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go
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Limited provision 
of regional public 
goods 
Support to the provision of regional 
public goods 
Medium PyP; CR; AT; DP
Limited 
involvement in the 
provision of global 
public goods
Support to actions aimed at 
improving involvement in the 
provision of global public goods
Medium CR; AT; DP
Support to supplementary actions  
for the adaptation of international 
measures related to international 
public goods
High PyP, AT, CR, DP
Su
pp
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t t
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Rules with 
asymmetrical 
results in the 
distribution of 
development 
opportunities
Support to the change of 
international rules, particularly 
those which restrict the countries’ 
room for policies 
Low PD
Non-inclusive 
global governance 
structures 
Promotion of more inclusive 
governance structures
Low PD
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